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Abstract: 
The present Anglo-American system of corporate control is said to be a random 
result of market forces, the strong influence of which resulted from a weak state, 
and undefined principles in the state’s economic policy until the 1930s. In 
contrast, in Continental Europe, strong states with a tendency to interfere with 
market forces were established. The events resulting in these two divergent 
systems must be analysed in order to understand what predominant factors 
catalyzed the development of the current corporate governance structures. Though 
values other than religious principles are likely to prevail today, this paper posits 
that religious foundations provide a sound explanation for the developmental path 
of corporate governance in Anglo-America and Continental Europe. Further, it 
assesses the impact of such an ethical theory of corporate governance history on 
contemporary convergence debate. In particular, it asserts that ethical restraints 
may explain path dependency, and that such an ethical path dependency is more 
likely in times of economic decline than in times of economic growth. Finally, it 
holds that, in homogeneous societies, ethics can in many respects substitute for 
good law.  
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 A. Introduction  
The present Anglo-American system of corporate control is said to be a 
random result of market forces, the strong influence of which was the result of a 
weak state, and undefined principles in the state’s economic policy until the 
1930s.1 In contrast, in Continental Europe, strong states which tended to interfere 
with market forces were established.2 The events leading up to these two 
divergent systems must be analysed in order to determine the factors that 
catalyzed the development of the current corporate governance structures.  
Though values other than religious principles are likely to prevail today, 
this paper posits that religious foundations provide a sound explanation for the 
developmental path of corporate governance in Anglo-America and Continental 
Europe. In addition, it assesses the impact of such an ethical theory of corporate 
governance history on the contemporary convergence debate.  
This paper is structured as follows. Part B. provides an overview, as well 
as critique, of the traditional categories of corporate governance systems. In an 
attempt to overcome the weaknesses that other categorizations of contemporary 
corporate governance systems exhibit, part C. develops an ethical theory of 
corporate governance history. It maintains that the different developments can be 
attributed to the specific strains of Christendom that prevailed in Anglo-America 
and Western Europe during the age of industrialization. Specifically, the focus is 
on whether a country developed strong capital markets (which are the 
precondition for a system herein called an ‘implicit system of corporate control’), 
or whether it developed explicit methods of corporate control. Naturally, some 
countries’ societies are and have always been reasonably heterogeneous in terms 
of religion. With respect to religious diversity, this paper argues that the ethical 
                                            
1 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the State in 
the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1, 24 et seq. (2001) [hereinafter The 
Rise]. Later, however, the American legislature interfered with a free development of banking 
structures, see MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 26 (Princeton University Press 1994). 
2 Id. 
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strain which politically dominated in the age of industrialization became 
influential on all later corporate governance systems. Part D. presents historical, 
systemic, and empirical evidence for my thesis, and discusses alternative 
explanations for the phenomena understood as evidence in this paper. Part E. 
assesses the impact of my theory on present theories of corporate governance 
convergence, as well as the good law – bad law debate which is closely associated 
with the former. If, in fact, ethics do influence the efficiency of any particular 
corporate governance device, transferring the legal scheme of one successful 
corporate governance system to another is unlikely to yield the desired results. 
Unless societies become indifferent with respect to cultural values that are based 
on religion, the ethical theory suggests that the legal scheme needs to be adjusted 
to suit the specific ethical background of the corporate governance system to 
which it is being transferred. This phenomenon, coined as “ethical path 
dependency,” supports the hypothesis that a “one size fits all” optimum cannot 
apply to all countries. Further, it might add to the existing explanations of why 
simply adopting a foreign legal model does not achieve the same results as the 
legal regime achieves in its country of origin. Finally, understanding the 
relationship between ethics and law helps us to better understand when ethics – 
not law – matter most. 
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B. Traditional Categories of Corporate Governance Systems 
Two types of legal studies utilize the concept of corporate governance 
categories. Some comparative literature focuses on systemic issues, examining 
forces that generally influence tendencies toward convergence and persistence. 
Another field of comparative literature examines specific elements of corporate 
governance systems, such as the presence of different types of shareholders, the 
degree of capital market development, and the degree of minority shareholder 
protection in order to account for differences between American and European 
corporate governance systems. While every categorization requires a minimum 
degree of flexibility in order to remain adaptable to different circumstances, e.g. to 
more than a limited number of countries, or to transition periods, most of the 
categorizations that current scholarship provides can be criticized from a 
methodological perspective for exhibiting deficiencies with respect to their 
doctrinal and statutory bases.  
This section discusses some of the most prominently argued 
misconceptions in drawing wedges between closely interrelated (both culturally 
and economically) economies. As Hayek suggested (in another context), grave 
consequences may follow from accepting “seemingly simple but false” 
categories.3 Thus, the adjustment of three biases is particularly essential for the 
purposes of further discussion. These are (1) the distinction between common 
and civil law jurisdictions,4 (2) the distinction between market and bank-
driven economies,5 and (3) Hansmann & Kraakman’s provocative assertion6 that 
                                            
3 Friedrich Hayek, The Pretense of Knowledge in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 266, 272 
(Nishijama & Leube eds. 1984). 
4 Primarily established by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, 
Corporate Ownership around the World 54 J. Fin. 471, 473 (1999) [hereinafter Corporate 
Ownership]; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny,  Legal 
Determinants of External Finance 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997); Law and Finance 106 J. Pol. Econ. 
1113, 1116 (1998); Investor Protection and Corporate Governance 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (2000); 
reconsidered, e.g., by Coffee, The Rise, supra note 1, at 45, 60 et seq. 
5 For example, Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong 
Securities Markets 48 UCLA L.R. 781, 842 (2000-2001) [hereinafter The Legal and Institutional 
Preconditions]; Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between European and 
American Corporate Governance: Which Model of Capitalism? 23 Brook. J. Int’l L. 833, 846 et 
seq. (1997-1998); La Porta et al. Corporate Ownership, supra note 4, at 508.  
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only the present American corporate world would be shareholder driven, while 
in France, the state would regularly intervene in corporate matters, and in 
Germany, labor interests would influence corporate decision making (at least) as 
much as would shareholder interests. Criticism is primarily helpful only if paired 
with better proposals. This is presented with the author’s distinction between 
Explicit and Implicit Systems of corporate control. 
I. Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions 
Relying on a distinction between civil and common law countries raises 
three major concerns. First, in many cases it is unclear what qualifies each country 
for membership in a specific category. For example, Japan is usually considered 
to be a civil law country. While the roots of the Japanese legal system are 
German, and it is thus based on civil law, the categorization neglects the fact that 
Japanese law after the Second World War has been fundamentally reformed under 
strong influence from the American state law of Illinois.7 Second, a bright-line 
distinction between European common and civil law countries can be questioned 
from an historical perspective: The original “common law” was the “canon law” 
or “jus commune” that was applied in bishops’ courts throughout the West.8 Why 
should then common law be so important for the developments of an “efficient” 
legal system in England, while it should not have been in Germany, where in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the church courts also had wide jurisdiction and 
played an extremely important role in shaping the legal system?9 Further, how do 
traditional cultural ties, or antagonism, which can be assumed to impact legal 
                                                                                                                       
6 Henry Hansman & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, (2001) 89 
Georgetown L.J. 439, 443 et seq. [hereinafter The End].  
7 For Japan’s hybrid law background see Curtis Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The 
Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance 149 U. Pa. L.R. 2083, 2123 Fn. 
131 (2001); MATHIAS SIEMS, DIE KONVERGENZ DER RECHTSSYSTEME IM RECHT DER AKTIONÄRE, 
7, 23-4 [THE CONVERGENCE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE LAW ON SHAREHOLDERS – A STUDY ON 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION] (Mohr Jus Privatum 
2005) [hereinafter SIEMS, CONVERGENCE (2005)]. 
8 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II – THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT 
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 35 (Harvard University Press 2003, 
Paperback 2006). 
9 Id. 
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development as well, fit into the picture?10 For example, traditionally strong ties 
existed between the Netherlands, a civil law country, and England, a common law 
country.11 Third, law & finance theorists disregard the differences between 
today’s common law and the common law that was exercised by courts in 
medieval England (which, according to La Porta et al., should have been the 
period that made the difference for legal development to this day ). Firstly, the 
Stuart Kings removed parts of the traditional law when it conflicted with the 
King’s power to charter corporations.12 Moreover, the doctrine of precedent, 
which is the hallmark of common law, received its modern meaning after the 
Glorious Revolution in 1689.13 In light of these facts, it is interesting to note that 
comparative studies as to the underlying legal assumptions of court activity in 
England and Germany show that court practice, at least in the last centuries, did 
not differ significantly.14 Thus, as to how the “legal family” should matter 
remains unclear. 
                                            
10 Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture, Law and 
Corporate Governance, 25 Int. Rev. L Econ. 2, 229, sub IV. C. (2005) [hereinafter Culture, Law], 
holding that without considering countries’ cultural region affiliation, the legal family 
classficiation alone may yield inaccurate depictions of global patterns in corporate governance 
regimes. 
11 After the ousting of the last Stuarts, the Dutch king (Wilhelm of Oranje) became English 
king, a development which was due to the strong religious, cultural, and commercial ties between 
both nations, see JOHN BOWLE, THE UNITY OF EUROPEAN HISTORY – A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL 
SURVEY 229-231 (OUP 1970). 
12 See Paul G. Mahoney Contract or Concession, 34 Ga. L.R.873, 881-6 (2000): common 
law would have enabled free incorporation through contracts, while the king’s prime source of 
income in times of colonization was fees for chartering corporations; Detlef Vagts, Comparative 
Company Law – The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT JEAN-NICOLAS DRUEY 598  (Rainer Schweizer 
et al. eds. 2002).  
13 BERMAN, supra note 8, at 9, 285 et seq. Principal changes included, inter alia, the 
establishment of the independence of the jury as trier of both fact and law, the introduction of the 
adversary system of presentation of evidence and new rules of evidence. 
14 Reinhard Zimmermann & Nils Jansen, Quieta Movere – Interpretative Change in a 
Codified System, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS – ESSAYS IN CELEBRATION OF JOHN FLEMING 285, 
311 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998). 
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II. Market- and Bank-Centered Economies 
Another common distinction refers to different legal regimes governing 
financial institutions. Until 1999,15 the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited 
American credit banks from engaging in investment banking and the mutual funds 
industry, as well as from making equity investments in non-financial firms for 
their own account, while German and Japanese institutions were not restricted in 
the same way.16 A categorization of corporate governance systems relying on this 
bank-influence is, however, not convincing. 
Despite the fact that until 199817 German banks influenced their clients 
through the triad of memberships in supervisory boards, proxy voting and creditor 
rights, a bank could not effectively exercise this power without risking a backlash 
by its own supervisory board and shareholder body, as German corporations were 
traditionally organized in interlocking shareholdings and directorates.18 In 
addition, the influence of banks was weakened because relatively low dividend 
pressure resulting from underdeveloped capital markets enabled firms to use 
extensive internal financing, and to forego external financing through the issuance 
of debt or equity. Further, share ownership of banks is not – and was never – 
extraordinarily high, as one would expect in a bank-centered economy. Shares 
held by German retail investors usually exceeded bank shareholdings, while non-
                                            
15 Through Gramm-Leach-Biley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, see Art Alcausin 
Hall, International Banking Regulation into the 21st Century: Flirting With Revolution 21 
N.Y.L.Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 41 (2001); Aigbe Akhigbe & Ann Marie Whyte, The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999: Risk Implications for the Financial Services Industry 27:3 J. Fin. 
Research 435 (2004). 
16 Mark Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United 
States 102 Yale L.J. 1927, 1948-9 (1992-1993) [hereinafter Some Differences]; a comparative 
overview over banking regulation provides SIEMS, CONVERGENCE (2005), supra note 7, at 
358 et seq. 
17 In 1998 the legislature enacted the Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich [Law on Furthering Control and Transparency in Corporate Law] v. April 
27, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I (1998), 786, which reduced bank-influence by imposing 
stricter formal conditions on banks organizing proxy voting, as well as by stricter limits and higher 
transparency of supervisory board memberships and meetings. 
18 This caused the legislature to enact in 1965 s. 19 Aktiengesetz [German Stock 
Corporation Act, hereinafter GSCA], according to which ownership rights in cross-ownerships 
exceeding 25% must not be exercised. 
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financial corporations held the bulk of the shares in public corporations.19 This 
data is consistent with concentrated ownership, but not with the theory of a bank-
centered economy. Banks were part of what has been called “Germany Inc.” – a 
company network that closely tied its members to national economic 
development, and mitigated competition among its members.20 In this network, 
banks were important and influential, but were neither the center21 nor the 
controlling part.22 The same aspect – that banks are involved, but do not control 
the economy – is true with respect to Japan, where banks belong to, rather than 
control keiretsu-conglomerates.23 Finally, there is some evidence that American 
banks control important voting stakes of non-financial firms through their trust 
business, and that American bankers are more likely to join the board of non-
financial firms of which their bank controls a large voting stake through its trust 
business.24 These characteristics used to be associated with bank-centered 
economies.  
                                            
19 A table of share ownership in German corporations is available at Deutsches 
Aktieninstitut (eds.), Factbook (2006), at www.dai.de (February 26, 2007). 
20 Martin Hoepner & Lothar Krempel, The Politics of the German Company Network 3, 
MPIfG Working Paper No. 2003-9, at http://ssrn.com/abstract =494722 (February 26, 2007). 
21 Rather, insurance companies (Allianz AG, Munich Re), which neither provided credit 
nor exercised voting rights, and industrial conglomerates (Daimler Benz AG, Veba/Viag, 
RWE/VEW) also held also wide-spread shareholdings. The fourth element of the Germany Corp. 
were the estates of the founder families (Thyssen, Krupp, Bosch, Siemens, Quandt, etc.). In this 
structure, bank-plans could indeed falter, for example the plan of forming a car-conglomerate of 
Daimler Benz AG and BMW AG in 1966. Though the legal details lack precision, for an 
instructive overview see idem and John W. Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of 
Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 Law and Policy 355 
(2002).
22 Ralf Elsas & Jan Pieter Krahnen, Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms in THE 
GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 197 (Jan P. Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt eds., OUP, 2nd ed. 
2004) and Roe, Some Differences, supra note 16, at 1945 show that with respect to the role of 
banks as monitoring investors, the evidence does not unanimously support a special role of banks 
for large firms. Joao A.C. Santos & Adrienne S. Rumble, The American Keiretsu and Universal 
Banks: Investing, Voting and Sitting on Nonfinancials' Corporate Boards 80 J. Fin. Econ. 419 
(2006) show similar structures for the U.S. 
23 Id. Specifically on the role of keiretsu-banks, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Cross-shareholding 
in the Japanese keiretsu, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE 348 (Gordon & Roe eds. 2004) and 
SIEMS, CONVERGENCE (2005), supra note 7, at 367 et seq. 
24 Santos & Rumble, supra note 22, at 11 et seq. show that, in 2000, American banks 
control on average 10% of the voting rights of S&P 500 non-financial firms, including several 
firms in which banks exercise 20% to 60% of the voting rights through their trust business. This 
evidence is consistent with that provided by R.M. SOLDOFSKY, INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS OF 
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III. Shareholder vs. Stakeholder Primacy 
Economists have shown that the interests of different stakeholder groups 
conflict in particular circumstances.25 Based on this premise, they demand that the 
law determines whose interest management should primarily pursue. Most likely 
due to the legislatures’ reluctance to articulate clear statements on this politically 
explosive issue,26 and the paucity of case law,27 the American legal literature 
responded in a fragmented way to the economists’ demand.28 Hansmann & 
                                                                                                                       
COMMON STOCK, 1990-2000: HISTORY, PROJECTION, AND INTERPRETATION (Ann Arbor: Bureau of 
Business Research, University of Michigan, 1971). It counters Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal 
Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies 27 J. of Fin. Econ. 7 (1990), who 
posits that banks were restrained from holding significant equity stakes in firms through their trust 
department. S.D. Prowse, Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial Behavior in 
the United States and Japan, 27 J. of Fin. Econ. 43 (1990), argues that American banks would be 
required by law to vote in the interest of the beneficial owners. This, however, is also the position 
under German law.
25 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 310 (1976); ALFRED RAPPAPORT, 
CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THE NEW STANDARD FOR BUSINESS PERFORMANCE (New York: 
Free Press, 1986). These conflicts include 1. insolvency: shareholders – creditors; 2. reduction of 
production: shareholders – workers; 3. geographical investment strategy: shareholders – state; 4. 
environmental aspects of production: shareholders – public; etc.  
26 The German legislature in its “official interpretation” of the German Stock Reform Act of 
1965 mentioned that corporations should not oppose the interests of the overall economy and the 
interests of society, while they should, among other interests, also regard interests of employees, 
see Bruno Kropff, Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Act] 97-98 (1965). However, this statement 
needs to be considered in the light of the “social welfare” clause of s. 70 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act of 1937, which bound corporations to merely pursue social welfare projects. The 
German majority opinion holds that corporations may and shall pursue shareholder interests, as 
long as management balances these interests with diverse interests of other stakeholders, see Peter 
O. Mülbert, Shareholder value aus rechtlicher Sicht [Shareholder value from a legal perspective], 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (ZGR) 129, 156 
(1997). 
27 For the United States, see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919), implicating 
shareholder primacy; however, the case has often been understood as a controlling shareholder vs. 
minority case, see the in-debth analysis by Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate 
Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style 29 Del. J. of Corp. L. 649, 689 (2004) 
[hereinafter the Maximands]. The German Federal Supreme Court in BGHZ 64, 325, 329 has used 
the expression “interests of the enterprise,” which commentators have interpreted as abbreviation 
for a behavior whose guidelines are the existence and long-term rentability of the firm, see 
HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ [STOCK CORPORATION ACT] § 76 Rn. 13 (7th ed. 2006) with further 
references.  
28 The majority of American scholarship posits shareholder primacy models, purporting that 
the primary goal of the public corporation ought to be maximizing shareholders’ wealth, and that 
the reduction of agency costs as central economic problem should be addressed by imposing duties 
of loyalty and care owed by directors and managers to shareholders, see, for example Lucian Arye 
Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corporation 105 Harv L.R. 1435, 1451 (1992) (implicitly); 
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Kraakman nevertheless confined their categories by contrasting American 
shareholder primacy with what they perceive to be the leading principles of other 
corporate governance models. These apparent leading principles include the 
strong influence or primacy of managers (historically in the United States), 
workers (Germany), or the state (France and Japan) in the firm. This 
categorization achieves dubious results, as a closer look at France and Germany 
illustrates.29  
Hansmann & Kraakman categorize the French economy as being state-
driven due to the state’s involvement in corporate affairs, and the replacement of 
shareholder suits with criminal sanctions for directors’ malfeasance.30 Doing so, 
they focus exclusively on a tiny excerpt from French corporate governance 
politics. The French state interferes sometimes31 with strategic decisions with the 
                                                                                                                       
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined 89 Mich. L.R. 520 (1990); Victor Brudney, 
Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract 85 Colum. L.R. 1403 (1985); 
FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 35 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors 43 Stan. L.R. 863, 879 (1991); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and 
the Market for Corporate Control 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965).  
In contrast, stakeholder models assume management should take into account interests of 
various stakeholder groups, see for example Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law 85 Va. L.R. 247 (1999); Marleen A. O’Connor, Organized 
Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism 31 U. Rich. 
L.R. 1345 (1997) and The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate 
Labor-Management Cooperation 78 Cornell L.R. 899 (1993); Duncan McLaren, Global 
Stakeholders: Corporate Accountability and Investor Engagement 12 Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 191 (2004); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law 39 
B.C. L.R. 283 (1998); David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law 
Reform: Employment at Will versus Job Security 146 U. Pa. L.R. 975 (1998) and New directions in 
Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law 50 Wash. & 
Lee L.R. 1373 (1993) and Theories of the Corporation 2 Duke L.J. 201 (1990), and the essays in 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).  
This discussion goes back to the 1930’s, see E.M. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees? 45 Harv. L.R. 1145 (1932); A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are 
Trustees: A Note 45 Harv. L.R. 1365 (1932). 
29 Hansman & Kraakman, The End, supra note 6, at 449 et seq.; the authors borrow heavily 
from Lawrence A. Cunningham Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of 
Global Corporate Governance 84 Cornell L.R. 1133, 1136 (1999). 
30 Hansmann & Kraakman, The End, supra note 6, at 446-447. 
31 While the creation of “national champions” by the French Government indeed occurs 
(examples include the merger of Sanofi-Synthelabo S.A. and Aventis S.A. Currently, EADS / 
Airbus is in the focus of French politics. French policy understands its measures as anti-takeover 
regulation by creating size against imperialistic American firms, most of which have strong anti-
- 13 - 
potential for having a national impact, rather than with day-to-day business. 
Consequently, it is very likely that a non-state mechanism for day-to-day control 
of the firm exists, which Hansmann & Kraakman do not examine. Moreover, 
criminal sanctions are not exclusively a French phenomenon. The criminal 
proceedings following the scandals associated with Enron, Worldcom and Tyco 
illustrate this argument. 
With respect to Germany, Hansmann & Kraakman’s consider worker co-
determination to be the most salient characteristic. Their emphasis on German 
workers’ co-determination, however, is methodologically flawed. Firstly the 
German Constitutional Court held that the final decision of the supervisory board 
must eventually lie in the hands of shareholders as property owners (or their 
representatives),32 while clear authority on this point does not exist in U.S.-
American law. Moreover, pursuant to the most relevant co-determination regime 
for large public corporations,33 shareholders and workers elect an equal number of 
supervisory board members. However, one of the worker representatives is an 
officer of the firm, and will typically represent management’s interests in practice. 
Furthermore, if there is a tie in the first vote on a proposal, the chairman of the 
board (who is a shareholder representative) will have two votes in a second vote, 
                                                                                                                       
takeover devices which cannot be exercised under mandatory Continental European corporate 
laws.), it does not so in all cases, as the successful takeover of Euronext by the NYSE 
demonstrates 
32 BVerfG of 01.03.1979 – 1 BvR 532, 533/77, BVerfGE 50, 290, 337 – Mitbestimmung -. 
33 German corporate law provides for three relevant types of co-determination regimes. The 
oldest and most extensive co-determination regime, though the least relevant today (with it being 
used by approximately 20 firms, including ThyssenKrupp AG) is the regime pursuant to Montan-
Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1951 (and Mitbestimmungsergänzungsgesetz of 1956) which merely 
regards corporations in mining industries and steel production. Supervisory Boards under this 
regime have 11, 15, or 21 members, of which shareholders and workers elect both the same 
number. One member of the employees’ bench is an officer of the corporation. The eleventh, 
fifteenth, or twenty-first member will be elected by shareholders on a proposal by the whole 
supervisory board (in which shareholder and workers are equally represented), for details see s. 8 
Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1951.  
Furthermore, under the co-determination regime pursuant to Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976 
for corporate groups with more than 2000 workers, workers elect half of the 12, 16, or 20 
supervisory board members. See, in particular, ss. 27, 29 (2) MitbestG 1976.  
Finally, the co-determination pursuant to Drittel-Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 2004 regards 
corporate groups with more than 500 and up to 2000 workers. Under this regime, a third of the 
supervisory members will be elected by workers. 
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thereby tipping the balance in favor of the owners. Since worker representatives 
are aware of this mechanism, they tend to avoid contentious votes by co-operative 
arrangements with the owner’s side. Further, they try to split the owners’ bench 
and gain influence through (sometimes tainted) information about the employees’ 
suggestions and discussions in board committees. Given these implications, co-
determination does not necessarily result in pro-labor decisions by the board. In 
fact, it is quite the opposite, since conflicts among owners are typically settled 
outside of the board room.34 Despite the proportional worker representation on 
supervisory boards, shareholder interests are routinely paramount.35  
 Coining the German economy as a “labor-oriented model” is apt to 
overlook other important aspects of corporate governance in Germany. Some of 
these include the vital questions which ask why shareholders invest in structures 
with concentrated ownership, and why dispersed shareholders, which held 45% of 
all shares when the structures of worker co-determination were first enacted by 
democratic devices, did not resist these structures.36
Furthermore, Hansmann & Kraakman’s assertion that the present 
American model would be the most efficient “standard model”37 creates a riddle: 
why should the present American model be the most efficient – the “End of 
History”, as they say, of corporate governance development-, while its 
predecessors have not been? Since legislatures strive for “local optima” through 
the development of complementarities,38 and the legislatures of advanced 
                                            
34 This does not mean that German co-determination will always result in an owner-favored 
decision, nor does it mean that the German supervisory board system is without weaknesses. For 
example, some German supervisory boards are too large (24 members) often resulting in 
inefficiencies. Labor Unions lobby against a reduction of board sizes since they reap some of the 
worker members’ compensations. 
35 Examples include Siemens’ and DaimlerChrysler’s agreements with worker 
representatives on increasing the amount of weekly average labor hours from 35 to 40 hours per 
week, see Reforming Europe's working practices, The Economist of July 29, 2004.  
36 The co-determination legislature was enacted in 1950–52. In these years German 
households held approximately 45% of all shares in public corporations, see Appendix A, relying 
on data taken from DAI, Factbook (2006), at www.dai.de (February 26, 2007).  
37 Hansman & Kraakman, The End, supra note 6, at 440-443. 
38 Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance 52 Stan. L.R. 127, 139 (1999) referring to Mark Roe, Chaos and 
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countries also have the intellectual and academic capacities to achieve it, why then 
should the present American system be the most efficient for the entire world? 
References to relatively short periods of economic superiority39 are not 
persuasive40: To the same extent that current Chinese enticement of international 
investment (which is likely due to the size of the Chinese internal market, 
advantageous labor prices and a state-directed monetary policy) does not 
necessarily prove that American-style corporate governance is inherently flawed, 
American-style corporate governance was not necessarily superior to Japanese 
and German-style corporate governance in the 1990s, and so on. Arguments from 
this “continually shifting debate”41 are unsuited to support a fundamental 
categorization. 
IV. Explicit and Implicit System of Corporate Control 
I prefer a categorization of corporate governance systems which relies on 
the primary means with which shareholders influence management. Under this 
categorization, there are Explicit Systems and Implicit Systems of corporate 
control. Explicit Systems of corporate control are based on direct influence of 
present shareholders - majority shareholders through board control, and minority 
shareholders by engaging in monitoring functions through shareholder meetings. 
In contrast, Implicit Systems of corporate control are predicated on the efficiency 
                                                                                                                       
Evolution in Law and Economics 109 Harv. L.R. 641-643 (1996); Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald 
Spindler, Path dependence and complementarity in Corporate Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND 
PERSISTENCE 114, 117 (Gordon & Roe, eds., 2004). 
39 Hansman & Kraakman, The End, supra note 6, at 449 et seq.; also, for example, though 
much more cautious, Roberta Romano, A cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative 
Corporate Law 102 Yale L.J. 2021, 2023 et seq. (1993). An overview of the perennial debate 
presents, inter alia, Ronald J. Gilson, Globalization of Corporate Governance: Convergence of 
Form or Substance, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329 (2001) and Corporate Governance and Economic 
Efficiency: When do institutions matter?,  74 Wash. U. L. Qu. 327 (1996). 
40 The fact that the German system was successful in the 1970s, the Japanese in the 1980s 
and the American in the 1990s, and the Chinese system may be successful in the 2000s, does not 
establish bullet-proof evidence for the efficiency of corporate governance systems, but for the 
periodical supremacy of overall economic conditions.. 
41 Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries, Stanford Law and 
Economics Olin Working Paper No. 333, 14 (2007), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=957895  (February 
26, 2007). 
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of the capital, product and labor markets. Shareholder influence is primarily 
exercised in a mediated, indirect way. For example, while the foundation of the 
French and German systems is an Explicit System of corporate control, an 
Implicit System of corporate control prevails in the Anglo-American countries. 
Moreover, it is maintained that the distinctive criteria has been far clearer in the 
past, while Western corporate law systems are generally converging towards an 
intermediate state, the golden mean, which is known as the “hybrid system.”42  
Details will not be presented here,43 but the core distinction itself is important 
for the further normative argumentation presented in this paper. Three 
characteristics mark the Implicit System. First, Implicit corporate control requires 
action beyond the circumscribed enclave of present shareholders and proxies 
immediately instructed by them. For example, capital market pricing requires 
activity by present and future shareholders. If there were either no present 
shareholders selling, or no future shareholders buying, a price could not be set.44 
Thus, the exit right of shareholders ensured by liquid capital markets is an implicit 
device. Second, the Implicit System does not require direct contact between 
shareholders and the company. Rather, if shareholders influence managers, they 
will do it indirectly, without contacting the firm, talking to management, or 
otherwise trying to influence their behavior. Direct contact, represented by 
shareholders’ votes, is an explicit, rather than an implicit, device. Finally, in the 
Implicit System, shares are commercialized, and can be wholly replaced by 
monetary compensation. In contrast, an Explicit System relies on the assumption 
that shares represent not only monetary value, but also – positively speaking – an 
opportunity, or – negatively speaking – a responsibility to influence managers. 
                                            
42 See Ulrich Noack & Dirk Zetzsche, Corporate Governance Reform in Germany: The 
Second Decade, 16:5 EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 1033 (2005). 
43 See Dirk Zetzsche, Explicit and Implicit System of Corporate Governance – a 
convergence theory, CBC-RPS No. 0001, 21 et seq. (2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=600722 
(February 26, 2007). 
44 Financial Intermediaries merely balance a short-term deficiency of sell / buy orders in a 
stock. 
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Thus, while both control systems are based on shareholder decisions and 
shareholder primacy, the degree of directorial deference that corporate law 
provides varies significantly. Corporate law in Explicit Systems presumes that 
directors and shareholders share the power in the corporation. In contrast, 
corporate law in Implicit Systems allots ultimate power to directors. Direct 
shareholder influence is merely deemed a part of a “rich array of constraints on 
directors that also includes markets, private ordering and norms.”45  
The Explicit / Implicit distinction challenges the orthodox American 
explanation as to why Continental Europe lacks developed capital markets, which 
is that Continental jurisdictions have failed in providing adequate protection to 
minority stockholders from expropriation either by management or by majority 
owners and, thus, strong securities markets could not develop.46 My theory 
implies that commentators have overlooked the key complement to implicit 
shareholder control through security markets, which is the explicit influence 
                                            
45 Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative 
Lawsuits, 58 Vand. L.R. 1747 (2004). 
46 See, for example, Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott Taking Shareholder Protection 
Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany 17 Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 44 (2005); Black, supra note 5, at 804; John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and 
Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure 25 J. Corp. Law 1 (1999) and 
Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its 
Implications 93 Nw. U. L.R. 641, 644 (1998-1999) [hereinafter Future As History] and The Rise, 
supra note 1, at 59; Jeffrey N. Gordon, An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence 
of Corporate Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European Union, 1990-2000, 
in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. 
Roe eds., Cambridge University Press, 2004), although Gordon accounts for the German 
convergence towards the American system with the German commitment to EU integration rather 
than with efficiency considerations; Hansman & Kraakman, The End, supra note 6, at 443; 
Charles P. Himmelberg, R. Glenn Hubbard & Insessa Love, Investor Protection, Ownership, and 
the Cost of Capital (2000) Col. Bus. Sch. WP (Feb 2000), at 
http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ghubbard/papers/HHL_6_14_ACRO.pdf (February 26, 
2007); La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 4, at 511; Legal Determinants, supra note 
4, at 1131; Law and Finance, supra note 4, at 1113; Investor Protection, supra note 4, at 3; Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737, 750 (1997) 
(though more cautious with respect to Germany); Romano, supra note 39, at  2023 et seq.  
Meanwhile, different opinions are noticeable. For example, ROE, supra note 1, holds that 
American populist politics are responsible for dispersed ownership; see also Dirk A. Zetzsche, 
Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of Public Corporations – A Six Country 
Comparison 2 ECFR 107 (2005) with further references in note 4-5.  
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exerted by minority shareholders. This is especially true with respect to 
Continental Europe’s largest economies, namely France and Germany.  
While my categorization does not provide the ground for a black-and-
white-distinction, the basic observation on which it is based provides the ground 
for the remainder of this paper – a greater and lesser willingness to accept market 
influence vis-à-vis a greater and lesser reliance on direct shareholder influence.  
 C. The Roots of Contemporary Corporate Governance Systems - 
An Ethical Theory 
All of the above approaches are of an observational, rather than of an 
analytical nature. Hence, they do not answer the most urgent question which is 
why these different categories of corporate governance exist in the first place? 
Why did policy makers choose different paths when facing the same corporate 
governance problem, namely, the problem of how to ensure that corporate 
directors and controlling shareholders conduct themselves appropriately, and 
refrain from taking advantage of (dispersed) shareholders’ lack of control over the 
assets of public corporations to the detriment of such shareholders?47 This paper 
answers those questions by taking the ethics of the respective societies into 
account.  
I. Norms Do Matter! 
All of the aforementioned approaches exhibit the weakness that they 
inherently presuppose the predominance of law. They do so, I purport, due to a 
home bias: To the same extent that a lawyer primarily regards his own discipline, 
                                            
47 JOHN H. FARRAR ET AL., FARRAR’S COMPANY LAW 301 (Butterworths, London et al - 
4th Ed.: 1998); Preface v to KLAUS J. HOPT ET AL. (EDS.), COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (OUP 1998); JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 133 
(Aspen Law & Business, 1995). Admittedly, there are many differences in the details of the 
definition of corporate governance. For example, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 46, 737 
associate with the expression a relatively narrow meaning, holding that it describes legal issues 
related to the problem of how equity investors receive a fair return on their investment in public 
corporations; FRANK A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1., 179 (St. Paul, Minn.: 2000) 
defines governance as “the question of how corporate law allocates power.” 
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a sociologist would possibly first consider social forces at work when observing 
the same phenomena. However, neither of the aforementioned authors can 
convincingly argue that factors other than law have not been relevant in shaping 
corporate law in the past. I believe, in contrast, that a law-based approach cannot 
alone explain what induces the law to look as it does currently.  
Thus, this paper seeks to find explanations for differences in law – by 
relying on non-legal institutions, such as differing values and social norms.48 This 
brings us to a topic which has been extensively discussed by lawyers49 and 
psychologists,50 and was the center of attention at a symposium at the University 
of Pennsylvania on the relevance of norms in corporate law in 2001.51 Do norms 
matter? In short, literature dealing with the correlation of laws and norms 
uniformly maintains that there is some interdependency. However, many 
questions remain as John Coffee aptly stated: “Norms do matter, but exactly when 
                                            
48 Social “Values” are the psychological counterpart of the “social norms” with which legal 
academia deals. Licht, The Maximands, supra note 27, at 657 (2004) defines values as 
“conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors select actions, evaluate people and 
events, and explain or justify their actions and evaluations.” For details see Amir N. Licht, Social 
Norms and the Law: A Social Institutional Approach 31-37, (March 2005) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract =710621 (February 27, 2007) (hereinafter Social Norms). 
49 Since the 1990s the law and economics literature on social norms has grown rapidly. It is 
not the purpose of this paper to repeat the basic insights of the law and the norms scholarship. For 
such an overview, see e.g. Licht, Social Norms, supra note 48, with further references at 16. 
50 See JOHN M. FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, ETHICS: PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES (Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich 1991); GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ETHICS (OUP 1978); MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE DESIGNED OUR 
UNIVERSAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG (Harper Collins, 2006); GILBERT HARMAN, EXPLAINING 
VALUE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (OUP 2000); John Mikhail & Cristina M. 
Sorrentino & Elizabeth Spelke, Toward a universal moral grammar, in PROCEEDINGS, TWENTIETH 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY (Morton A. Gernsbacher and Sharon 
A. Derry, eds., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 1998). 
51 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, 
Legality and the Transplant Effect, 47:1 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 165 (2003); Robert Cooter 
& Melvin A Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Forms 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1717 
(2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253 (1999); 
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation 149 U. Pa.L. Rev. 1619 (2001); Donald Langevoort, The Human Nature 
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and 
Accountability 89 Geo. L.J. 797 (2001). 
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and to what extent remain more problematic issues.”52 Exactly these more 
problematic issues will be explored in this section. 
The problems start, as Larry Mitchell emphasized,53 with the distinction 
between “norms” and “law”. This paper understands social norms as non-legal 
institutions, which rely on ethical consent among the respective social group. 
Norms have something to do with “obligation”, hence feelings about what is 
wrong and what is right – regardless of immediate benefits, or sanctions, for 
compliance, or breach of these norms. Norms are internalized values of the 
society in question.54
The very existence of such “obligations” was the subject of extensive 
research pursued by Amir Licht and his co-authors on the co-relation of social 
norms and the law.55 Drawing on cultural value dimensions identified by 
psychologists Geert Hofstede56 and Shalom Schwartz,57 these studies reveal 
significant differences in values between countries of the Western hemisphere and 
all others, with respect to the rule of law, corruption, and accountability, all of 
                                            
52 John C. Coffee, “Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation”, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
2151, 2175 (2001).  
53 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms 49 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 177, 196 (1999); 
in contrast to Mitchell’s value-based understanding of norms, some authors rely on an 
understanding of social norms as a non-enforceable set of rules, see, e.g. Eilis Ferran, Corporate 
Law, Codes and Social Norms – Finding the Right Regulatory Combination and Institutional 
Structure (Working Paper 2003, on file with author). 
54 Mitchell, idem, at 215, 217. 
55 Licht, The Maximands, supra note 48, at 657 and The Mother of All Path Dependencies: 
Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 147, 173 
(2001) and Accountability and Corporate Governance (2002), at http://ssrn.com/abstract =328401 
(February 27, 2007) (hereinafter Accountability); Social Norms, supra note 48, and Amir N. Licht, 
Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law 
and Other Norms of Governance (2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=314559 (February 27, 2007); 
Licht et al., Culture, Law, supra note 10, at 229.  
56 See GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, 
BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2001) and HOFSTEDE, GEERT AND HOFSTEDE, GERT JAN CULTURES AND 
ORGANIZATIONS, SOFTWARE OF THE MIND: INTERCULTURAL COOPERATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
FOR SURVIVAL (2nd ed., McGraw-Hill 2004). 
57 For example, Shalom H. Schwartz, Cultural Dimensaions of Values: Towards and 
Understanding of National Differences in INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM: THEORETICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 85 (Uichol Kim et al. eds., 1994), cited from Licht’s studies. 
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which are eminent features for a well-functioning corporate governance system.58 
Extending this approach, I believe that normative differences also explain the 
legal differences which we see today among countries within the Western 
hemisphere. 
While doing so, I am aware that “[n]orms are fuzzy.”59 “While we seem to 
have a grasp of the potency of social norms, we still lack understanding of their 
structure, the factors that cause them to emerge, and their relations with the legal 
system.”60 Putting norms, culture and the law in context is even more 
complicated, as culture is diverse per se, and it is even more so in a cross-border 
context. Thus, some simplifications are conceded: It is not the intention of this 
paper to challenge the fuzziness of norms. By virtue of the example of religion, 
however, this paper might shed some light on two aspects of the relationship of 
norms and law, which is how norms emerged and how these norms have 
influenced law-making. 
II. The Normative Pillars of Western Culture 
Assessing the impact of norms on corporate governance requires, first, the 
refining of specific norms that may be relevant in the context of this paper. 
Historians recognize three pillars of Western (European) legal tradition. First: The 
ideal of free and rational thought - a development that is owed to the Ancient 
Greeks. Second: A neutral state administration designed to pursue the goal of its 
citizens’ “good life,” rather than the individual interests of its kings, queens or 
oligarchs. This ideal was first developed in the Roman res publica, and analysed 
in Ciceros’s de legibus. Third: Christianity.61
                                            
58 E.g. Licht, Accountability, supra note 55, at 5.3. 
59 Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1699 
(1996). 
60 Licht, Social Norms, supra note 48, at 5. 
61 BOWLE, supra note 8, at 85. 
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The degree of rational thinking of policy makers and corporate 
stakeholders on corporate law development62, as well as, the impact of an 
efficient administration on corporate law has been sufficiently considered in the 
current body of literature.63 Despite Harold Berman’s64 as well as Douglas 
Branson’s thoughtful advice,65 modern corporate law scholarship66 has neglected 
to recognize Christianity as the third cultural root of Western legal tradition.67 
This is particularly unfortunate since “broad similarities are obvious in terms of 
the relative development and maturity of legal institutions across Europe and the 
United States.”68 Since these institutions impact particularly on the application or 
enforcement of law, they, in fact, deserve more attention.  
                                            
62 This is essentially what historical corporate law scholarship is about; see, in particular, 
Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us 1 Berkeley 
Bus. L. J. 5 (2004) (hereinafter Reforming Corporate Governance) and Locking in Capital: What 
Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century 51 UCLA Law 
Review 387, at 423 (2003; Coffee, The Rise, supra note 1; Coffee, Future As History, supra note 
46. 
63 See, for example, the landmark work by JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS (New Haven, 1938). His political work instructively illustrate THOMAS K. MCCRAW, 
PROPHETS OF REGULATION 153 (Belknapp Press of Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge MA: 1984) 
and JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 62, 124 (3rd Ed., Aspen NY 2003). 
64 BERMAN, supra note 8, at 373: “Contemporary scholars in all the relevant fields … 
have largely neglected to consider the impact of belief systems generally on law.”  
65 Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance: The Significance of 
“Soft Law” and International Institutions, 34 Ga. L.R. 669, 691 (2000): “The teaching of years of 
comparative study is that it is the culture beneath the law and behind economic and other 
institutions that is as or more important than law itself, legal structures, and good governance 
practices.”  
66 The 19th century legal scholarship was more aware of the impact of ethics on law, see e.g. 
H. Fick Ueber Begriff und Geschichte der Aktiengesellschaften [About the term and history of 
corporations] 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT 1 (1862).  
67 This might be due to a misunderstanding of the term ‘rationality’, which sees religion and 
culture as its anti-thesis. Religion and culture is then merely a historical pre-condition to the 
dominance of rationality. However, considering ethical roots such as Christianity provides better 
help in understanding the present state of the law, as opposed to applying principles of rationality 
to periods in which rationality did not supersede other influences on rule makers, such as ethics (.) 
MAX WEBER, PROTESTANTISCHE ETHIK UND DER “GEIST” DES KAPITALISMUS – SCHRIFTEN ZUR 
RELIGIONSSOZIOLOGIE I (PROTESTANT ETHICS AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM – TEXTS ON 
SOCIOLOGY PERTAINING TO RELIGIONS I) I.2., at [62] (1920) (online version by E. Flitner ed., 
Univ. Potsdam, 1999) [hereinafter WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHICS] demonstrated with respect to 
capitalistic beliefs that a rationalistic approach cannot explain, why policy makers pursue some 
aspects of a generally accepted value, while others are not pursued. Consequently, an ethical 
analysis of corporate law development might provide insights into the irrational elements of 
policy making. 
68 Coffee, Future As History, supra note 46, at 645. 
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The Christian belief is rooted in the (Jewish-based) Pauline doctrine, 
combining the ideas of human guilt, asceticism, punishment, election, and – 
finally – redemption.69 However, the Jewish roots have been significantly 
changed with respect to its attitude toward market forces and commerce under the 
influence of the New Testament.  
While “[c]ommerce has never been much of a problem for Jews [, t]he act 
of commerce, the existence of a commercial society, has always been a problem 
for Christians.”70 Moreover, - an aspect which is disregarded in many works71 
dealing with the influence of religion on society, despite Max Webers extensive 
work with respect to this point – when considering the attitudes towards economic 
activity, the major Christian strands of belief vary significantly, even among 
Protestant strains of belief.  
 
Catholicism is traditionally critical with respect to the impact of market 
forces on society. From an historical standpoint, there may be sociological reasons 
dating back to the fate of the first Christian communities in Ancient Greece and 
Rome.72 As a matter of fact, being particularly concerned with the poor and 
despising commerce became part of Catholicism’s core values. In the 13th century, 
Thomas Aquinas developed in his “Summa Theologiae” a framework that 
determined catholic business ethics until 1891 when Pope Leo XIII issued his 
famous “Rerum Novarum” Encyclical on Capital and Labor.73 Under Thomas 
Aquinas’ doctrine, the ethical value of profit and pursue of profit is discussed with 
regard to the question of whether a person may sell goods at a higher price than 
the cost of creating the goods. Principally, a contract is fair, when both parties 
                                            
69 BOWLE, supra note 8, at 79-80. 
70 Irving Kristol, Spiritual Roots of Capitalism and Socialism in CAPITALISM AND 
SOCIALISM – A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY 1 (Michael Novak ed. AEI, Washington, D.C., 1979).  
71 See, for example, Id..; Rene Stultz & Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and 
Finance 70 J. of Fin. Econ. 313 (2003); A remarkable exception is URIEL PROCACCIA, RUSSIAN 
CULTURE, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE MARKET ECONOMY (forthcoming July 2007). 
72 Kristol, supra note 70, at 9. 
73 POPE LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM – ENCYCLICAL ON CAPITAL AND LABOR (1891), at 
www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/index.htm (February 26, 2007). 
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gain from it equally. If this is not the case in an economic sense, Thomas Aquinas 
distinguishes between two different types of contracts. First, there are barter deals. 
If one side of the barter deal is better off, this “profit” is due to the nature of the 
barter deal, as each side tries to cover its natural needs as effectively as possible. 
This type of profit is considered to be neutral, from an ethical point of view. On 
the other hand, profit from cash deals supports an individual’s limitless pursuit of 
power. However, Thomas Aquinas narrowed down the scope of his negative 
judgement on profits to those businesses that supported primarily the individual’s 
personal desires, rather than the society’s needs. Thus, the (intended) use of the 
profit determines whether profit itself is good or bad. If, for example, the 
merchant uses his reasonable profit for the maintenance of his house, for charity, 
or in order to ensure that his country has access to the goods that it needs for 
survival and development, profit is considered merely to constitute the merchant’s 
salary, and thus not profit in a technical and ethically suspect way.74  
If profit is, per se, subject to religious restraints, “pure” dealing on capital 
or product markets, solely motivated by the pursuit of profit, is considered to 
constitute irresponsible, unjustified activity.75 Under this premise, the institution 
of organized large scale markets was suspicious as it induced human beings to 
become sinners by forgetting their ethical duties vis-à-vis the community, while 
striving for their own personal good. 
Catholicism retained its difficult relationship with business and 
commercial activity at least until economists unveiled justifications for 
(restrained) business (in contrast to unrestrained business as promoted by liberals 
that adhered to egoism as a virtue) as driving forces for the common good in a 
dynamic society based on growth.76
 
                                            
74 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II-II, Question 77 (4) cited from ARTHUR 
FRIDOLIN UTZ, SOZIALETHIK – PART 4 [SOCIAL ETHICS – PT. IV] 226-8 (Scientia Humana Institut, 
Bonn: 1994).  
75 UTZ, supra note 74, at 200-5.  
76 With Josef Schumpeter and Walter Eucken being some of the most influential economists 
with respect to Continental Europe’s approach towards business. 
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From an economic point of view, the most important difference between 
Catholicism and Protestantism is Martin Luther’s ethical qualification of a 
believer’s occupation. While from a Catholic’s point of view, one’s occupation is 
ethically neutral, Protestants understand their occupation as a “calling”, and 
associate the highest value with the fulfilment of their day-to-day duties. 
Regardless of whether one works as master or servant, all religiously acceptable 
jobs (this qualification excludes, for example, criminals) have the same positive 
ethical qualification, while being lazy or idle, in general, are considered sins.77 In 
pursuing their ’calling’, it is the duty of Christians to use their will and reason to 
do as much good and to attain as much understanding of the world and its wordly 
and spiritual challenges as possible.78 Therefore it is the outspoken Protestant 
ideal that as many Christians (both male and female) as possible are able to read 
and understand the Bible as the ultimate source of Lutheran belief.79
While these religious duties to work and to further one’s own scientific 
and academic progress might explain the greater economic activity and 
achievements present in Protestant, as compared to Catholic societies80, it cannot 
explain the different economic developments, nor the different approaches with 
respect to corporate governance systems among Protestant societies themselves. 
This is particularly true, as significant differences exist between parts of Germany 
and Scandinavia, on the one hand, and parts of Switzerland, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, on the other hand. As table 1 shows, the 
strands of Protestantism prevailing in these countries differ. Lutheran-
Protestantism prevailed in the former, while Calvinistic-Puritanism’s doctrine 
dominated the culture of the latter. 
 
                                            
77 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHICS, I.3., at [64-71] and [169-175] 
78 BERMAN, supra note 8, at 42. 
79 Id. at 64. 
80 The Roman-Catholic belief was predominant throughout the 19th century in all of south, 
and most of west Continental Europe, besides the Netherlands, the German parts of Switzerland 
and the North and East of Germany. 
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Chart 1: Strands of belief in Europe and North-America81
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(Source: CIA World Factbook March 2005; DK World Desk Reference 2000; www.wikipedia.de)
                                            
81 Appendix 1 shows more specific data on religions in Europe and North America. 
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Lutheranism and Calvinism differ significantly with respect to their 
attitude toward market forces and business: While both convictions accept the 
idea of a calling, they qualify the pursuit of profit differently. Being traditional 
and dogmatically very similar to Catholicism,82 Martin Luther holds that, since 
the pursuit of profit can only be achieved at others’ costs, it is sinful and should 
thus be left to the heathens. A believer should concentrate on her or his God-given 
occupation, which she or he must not challenge or change by, for example, 
improving the tools of production, etc.83  
Calvinistic-Puritanism, though far from being focused on financial affairs, 
took a much more world-directed stance. Based on the doctrine of predestination, 
the distribution of any characteristic, personal good, or idea, is assumed to be 
God-given.84 Consequently, neither wealth, nor its maximization through the 
pursuit of profit-maximizing opportunities or inventions, is assumed to be sinful. 
Though riches for the believer’s fleshly ends must not ultimately be intended – 
Calvinists denounced such a desire as sinful worship of Mammon –, profitability 
of the occupation will accrue to God’s honour85 - unless it results in laziness, 
since enjoying one’s wealth and refraining from work means denying God his 
dignity and honour, which then results in the foreclosure of one’s access to 
paradise.86 The true believer thus worships by pursuing her or his calling. 
Consequently, in contrast to Lutheran and Catholic societies, wealth maximization 
by trade or industrial activity is a generally accepted goal in Calvinistic 
societies.87 This must not be misunderstood as legalization of exploitation. The 
impact of “capitalistic” beliefs is balanced by the communitarian ideal of charity, 
which imposes duties on the wealthy to share its wealth with the poor, rather than 
                                            
82 And – since this is derived from the Old Testament - also to the Jewish belief, before the 
Talmud, see WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHICS, I.3., at [74]. 
83 Id., at I.3., at [75-79]. 
84 Id., at I.3., at [92-93]. 
85 Id., at I.3., at [176-177]. 
86 Id., at I.3., at [166-172]. 
87 BOWLE, supra note 8, at 192; Kristol, supra note 70, at 18 et seq.  
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to forego opportunities whose use harms others on religious grounds, as Martin 
Luther and Catholic ethics suggest. Thus, Calvinistic ethics strongly encouraged 
the development of market institutions that were not subject to state interference.  
I hold that the different attitude towards the impact of (capital) markets on 
society, and thus the different corporate governance systems, which we observe 
today, is consistent with the various religious backgrounds of societies.  
III. The Diversity Problem 
A theory positing an interrelation between Calvinism and a corporate 
governance system based on market forces, and Catholicism and Lutheranism and 
a corporate governance system based on alternative, predominantly explicit 
means, must pay special attention to inhomogeneous societies. This means: As 
people are diverse, the ethical identities and values of which they possess are 
diverse, as well. Thus, an ethical theory of Western88 corporate governance 
history can only be maintained if the relevant ethics cited as explanations for an 
Explicit or Implicit System of corporate control were, in fact, dominant when 
policy makers chose the specific development path for their country’s corporate 
governance system. 
This section determines the relevant period that business ethics became 
influential on corporate governance policy. Further, it determines which set of 
business ethics was prevailing in which country at which point in time. 
1. The Industrialization Theory 
Corporate governance regimes require corporations. Corporations in the 
modern meaning did not exist in Europe prior to 1604, when the Dutch-East-India 
Company was founded. In the first centuries of corporatism (17th – 18th century), 
                                            
88 The proposition stated herein is strictly limited to Western Europe. It remains to be 
examined whether the industrialization theory contains a generally applicable principle to the 
development of other nations’ corporate governance systems, as well, such as Japan or China. 
Given that Japanese society, at least, was heavily shaken by the loss of the Second World War, 
some exceptions may apply. With respect to China, the observable period of time is too short to 
whether collaborative elements will be retained when China develops into a social-democratic 
society. 
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companies were semi-public corporations with territorial monopolies. As such, 
they were predominantly part of the state administration, and only to a lesser 
degree for-profit-businesses. In contrast, modern corporations were founded in 
order to ensure appropriate financing for businesses that require significant 
investment in order to succeed in competitive markets. These investments became 
necessary, as the end of Mercantilism and scientific progress provided for chances 
to invest in businesses that employed the many new technologies developed in the 
period of industrialization (railroads, steam machines, etc.). However, because the 
polity tends, generally speaking, to respond to crises rather than to prevent them, 
it takes some time between the occurrence of mass-scale investment and the 
polity’s decision with respect to the way in which it will respond to corporate 
governance problems resulting from them. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
the specific developmental path that corporate law makers chose for their own 
corporate governance systems depended upon the religious strain of belief that 
dominated at the height, rather than the beginning, of the Industrial Revolution. 
Further, as change is costly – a phenomenon which results in path dependency –, 
we may assume that the decisions made at the great divide in the 19th century can 
still be seen in the contemporary corporate governance systems.89  
2. Non-Diverse Countries 
From a religious perspective, France, Spain, and Italy were homogenous 
societies until at least the middle of the 20th century. Traditionally, Spanish and 
Italian emperors oppressed Protestant tendencies in their home jurisdictions. 
However, they were less successful with respect to the Netherlands, which were 
subsequently divided into a Catholic part, later called Belgium, and a Protestant 
part, the Netherlands of today. The Netherlands will be considered below. 
                                            
89 Ditto ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF ESSAYS 5 – 71 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 
1962); NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-
FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2001). In contrast, 
Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins 117 Q. J. Econ. 1193 (2002) trace the origins 
of legal systems back to the 11th century. 
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In the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation, a significant part of the 
French nobles and merchant citizens became Huguenots – a Protestant strand of 
belief. However, following the Massacre of St. Berthelemew in 1572, the Catholic 
French king annihilated, or expelled, most of the Huguenots. Thus, France’s 
population remained almost entirely Catholic from the 16th century through to the 
very present. Notwithstanding the fact that the French Revolution in 1789 
eliminated the strong influence of the Catholic priests on the French legal system, 
and that French parliament adopted laicism in 1907, 85% of the French population 
is still Catholic.90  
Similar is the situation with respect to the almost purely Lutheran 
countries of Scandinavia. Interestingly, the Lutheran kings of Sweden were the 
protectors of Protestantism in 17th century Continental Europe. The values 
embedded in Lutheranism apparently continue to be influential to this very day. 
3. Diverse Countries 
In contrast, from a religious perspective, we observe heterogeneous 
societies in the U.S., England, Canada and Germany. Further, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands provide riddles that remain to be solved.  
 
With respect to the United States, though Chart 1 above shows religious 
diversity, White Anglo-Saxon Protestants determined American business policy 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.91 While some of the Founding Fathers were 
deeply religious Puritan Calvinists (such as John Adams and Jefferson), others, 
such us Benjamin Franklin, are more accurately described as Deists and 
enlightened humanists.92 However, these individuals were combined through a 
                                            
90 Prof. Rauscher mentioned that French socialism and Catholicism have apparently found a 
way to co-exist. For example, Francois Mitterand, the long-term socialist president of the French 
Republic, wanted to be buried in the courtyard of the village where he received his first 
communion. This is consistent with my findings. 
91 See Seymour Martin Lipset, Religion in American Politics in CAPITALISM AND 
SOCIALISM – A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY 61 (Michael Novak ed. AEI, Washinton, D.C., 1979). 
92 Walter Isaacson, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN – AN AMERICAN LIFE 84, 451, 467 (Simon & 
Schuster Paperbacks: New York et al., 2004), also describing Franklin’s origin and youth in a 
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common set of values (which Max Weber93 inaccurately solely associated with 
Calvinism), in particular the “concentration on rationalism, on the accumulation 
of money, on investment, [and ] on asceticism.”94 In addition, the 16th through 
18th century Lutherans and Calvinists were strongly communitarian men; 
Protestant congregations were “close-knit, self-governing “covenanted” 
fellowships”.95 (It was not until the 19th century that individualism became widely 
accepted in American society.96) These characteristics were frequently deemed 
necessary characteristics for the development of capitalism, as it provides the 
ground for large organisations that eventually benefit the capitalist shareholders. 
Moreover, paired with the spirit of Enlightenment, these skills also furthered 
optimism about education and progress, and thus entrepreneurial success.97
Through great waves of Italian and Irish (Catholic) immigrants at the end 
of the 19th century, Catholicism gained some influence,98 but the WASP-
dominance remains to today. Today, 54% of Americans belong to Protestantism, 
most of them to Protestant sects with market ethics equivalent to Calvinist 
doctrine.99  
 
                                                                                                                       
strictly Puritan Boston (at 32) and his practical approach towards Calvinism (at 46); BERMAN, 
supra note 8, at 25.  
93 Id., at 72. 
94 Id., at 72; for Benjamin Franklin’s similar values, see Isaacson, supra note 92, at 78, 89, 
266. 
95 BERMAN, supra note 8, at 26; these values became also characteristic for less religious 
Americans, see for Franklin e.g. Isaacson, supra note 92, at 50, 103, 266, stating that Franklin 
pushed for “civic cooperation, social compassion and voluntary community improvement 
schemes”.  
96 BERMAN, supra note 8, at 25, calls this the “Decline” of Protestantism.  
97 For e.g. Franklin see Isaacson, supra note 92, at 93 and 266. 
98 In the 17th and 18th century, there were British, French and Spanish colonies in North-
America. British immigrants were predominantly Puritans, while the French and Spanish were 
Catholics. Even after expansion of the U.S. into the former French and Spanish territories, WASPs 
were prevailing from an economic, political and a social point of view and superseded the 
influence of other European and Asian immigrants, see William E. Forbath, Politics, State 
Building, and the Courts, 1870-1920 in CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA - VOL. II 1168-
75 (Michael Grossberg, Christopher Tomlins, eds., forthcoming 2007) (even purporting that Aryan 
racism were widely spread among the WASP-elite).  
99 Id., at 71-76. 
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Conversely, in England, Calvinism-Puritanism never became the 
established religion. The ethical roots of the Anglican Church were those of 
Catholicism, in particular, Thomas Aquinas’ contract doctrine and the prohibition 
of usury, the latter in a very wide meaning, as a thirteenth-century manual 
demonstrates.100 From the very beginning, Reformation did not change this anti-
business attitude.. Economic enterprises were damned as a new form of the sin of 
covetousness. After the Reformation, ”buying and selling, letting and hiring, 
lending and borrowing, [remained] to be controlled by a moral law, of which the 
Church was the guardian.”101 In practice, in order to retain stability, wages, the 
entry into a trade, dealings in grain and wood, and many prices for goods were 
subject to controls, in order to prevent social dislocation.102 Further, these 
principles accounted for interventionist policy in the relationship between farmers 
and money-lenders in the 16th through the early 17th centuries.103
Individualist ideas gained more and more ground in the post-Reformation 
English Elizabethan society as commercial interests were growing in wealth and 
influence with the ongoing economic development and expansion of the 
Commonwealth to overseas. As the divorce between religious theory and 
economic realities became evident in the 17th through 18th centuries, Calvinism-
Puritanism became influential in England as it literally captured the industrial and 
commercial centers, especially London, of England from 1650 through 1680. 
English Calvinism-Puritanism was the “Second Protestant Revolution” in 
Europe,104 “the true English Reformation, and it is from its struggle against the 
                                            
100 See RICHARD HENRY TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM – A HISTORICAL 
STUDY 157 (1937) (Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: 1972): “Not only 
the taking of interest for a loan, but the raising of prices by a monopolist, the beating down of 
prices by keen bargainers, the rack-renting of land by a landlord, the sub-letting of land by a tenant 
at a rent higher than he himself paid, the cutting of wages and the paying of wages in truck, the 
refusal of discount to a tardy debtor, the insistence on unreasonably good security for a loan, the 
excessive profits of a middle-man – all these had been denounced as usury in the very practical 
thirteenth-century manual of St Raymond[.]”  
101 Id., at 161.  
102 Id., at 171.  
103 Id., at 156-8, and 175-7.  
104 BERMAN, supra note 8, at 8.  
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old [Anglican-Catholic] order that an England which is unmistakably modern 
emerges.”105 The Calvinist business world in the early days of modern England 
developed its own religious and political ideology and gained influence through 
its economic power.106 Finally, Calvinist business ethics were adopted by the 
Anglican Church through the back door. Striving for unity in England when 
facing the threat of a constantly growing Puritan community, the Anglican Church 
consented to a compromise under which “the bulk of Church property, as well as 
much preferment”107 went into lay hands – i.e. the hands of the bourgeoisie, 
which was the strong-hold of the Puritan movement.108 Hence, to a certain extent, 
Anglicanism has been captured by Calvinism with respect to the business ethics 
prevailing. Today, the Anglican Church describes itself as following Evangelical, 
Catholic, and Liberal traditions, all at the same time. In this regard,, Liberalism is 
understood as a commitment to “develop Christian belief and practice in order to 
respond creatively to wider advances in human knowledge and understanding, as 
well as the importance of social and political action in forwarding God’s 
Kingdom.”109
 
Canada’s population in the 18th and 19th centuries was fed by the French 
and the British homelands. Still today, both heritages leave their mark on the 
Canadian legal system. While the British settlers tried to supersede French law in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, French resistance in Quebec forced British policy-
makers to allow the Province of Lower Canada the use of its own language and its 
own laws. It is consistent with Canada’s diverse culture that, with respect to 
corporate governance (and other, particularly social institutions, as well), Canada 
relies to a lesser degree on market forces110 as well as on shareholder primacy111 
                                            
105 TAWNEY, supra note 100, at 199. 
106 Id., at 209.  
107 BOWLE, supra note 8, at 192. 
108 TAWNEY, supra note 100, at 190.  
109 At www.cofe.anglican.org/about/history/  (February 26, 2007). 
110 Zetzsche, Explicit and Implicit System, supra note 43, at B.III.2., and Shareholder 
Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings, supra note 46.  
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than does the United States. Further, while it is not clear that concentrated 
ownership is due to a lesser reliance on market forces in Canada (as other 
explanations may also hold true112), this observation is (at least) consistent with a, 
relatively speaking, high level of concentrated ownership in Canada.113  
 
Germany has been diverse ever since the times of the Reformation. From 
1530 through 1648, European nobles fought on German soil as to whether 
Protestantism should have a strong-hold in Germany.114 In contrast to England, 
these wars stripped the Bourgeois of their economic power. This is particularly 
true with respect to the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48). This war alone diminished 
Germany’s population by two-thirds. Prussian kings who had lost 75% of their 
population in their core-country Mark Brandenburg in 1648, were effectively 
forced to become tolerant, from a religious point of view, as religious tolerance 
lured settlers into the deserted regions. Consequently, they invited people from all 
over Europe with various religious backgrounds to settle in Brandenburg and 
Prussia. 
Following the end of the seven year war in 1763, Prussia became the 
prevailing power in Germany. At this point in time, the (since 1613) Calvinist-
Protestant Kings of Prussia115 ruled over a Lutheran country with a significant 
Catholic population remaining. Due to the horrendous experiences of religious 
wars in Germany, Prussian kings adopted an official doctrine of tolerance and 
                                                                                                                       
111 Directors' fiduciary duties are set out in Section 122(1)(a) of the Canadian Business 
Corporation Act [R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44] and require that directors "act honestly and in good faith 
with a view to the best interests of the corporation." In its landmark decision Peoples Department 
Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Oct. 29, 2004), the Supreme 
Court of Canada confirmed that directors owe their fiduciary duty solely to the corporation, and 
not to any particular stakeholder group.  
112 Ronald J. Daniels & Edward M. Iacobucci, Some of the Causes and Consequences of 
Corporate Ownership Concentration in Canada in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 97 
(Randall K. Morck, ed. NBER-C 2000). 
113 It does not provide evidence for concentrated ownership, however. 
114 BERMAN, supra note 8, at 57-62 provides a brief overview of events. 
115 The Prussian Kings of the family of Hohenzollern were originally from the German 
region of Baden-Württemberg. 
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moderation.116 Religious extremes never gained influence over state policy. Their 
economic approach was Lutheran, as the state’s, (not the King’s!) rather than any 
individual’s interest, was the promise to which any Prussian citizen was bound.117
Since Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, Prussian kings handed over 
governmental powers with respect to specialist topics such as education and 
business to its well-educated bureaucrats, which turned Prussia into a modern 
state. While we find both market-friendly Calvinists and market-hostile Lutherans 
in this bureaucracy, there was never any doubt that the common good of the state 
was superior to any other individual interest. Calvinist and Lutheran work ethics, 
marked by discipline, hard labor, and modesty, mixed with a Lutheran pro-state 
attitude, resulted in an administration, which was strictly autonomous from private 
interests and local institutions and so efficient, that the later U.S. President Wilson 
wished to “Prussianize” the U.S. government.118
In 1817, the Prussian king forced the reformed Calvinist and the Lutheran 
churches into a union,119 in order to avoid further struggle among different strains 
of Protestant belief. While, under traditional Protestant belief, the parish 
substitutes for the (Catholic) Church (as an institution) to which the Christian is 
responsible,120 under the (officially mandated) Prussian united church’s doctrine, 
                                            
116 The famous Prussian King Friedrich II is said to have been particularly unconcerned by 
religious debates. When a parish required the King to replace a pastor who denied the existence of 
doomsday and the phenomenon of resurrection, hence pillars of Christian doctrine, the King wrote 
back: “If the pastor does not want to stand up on doomsday, he may as well stay asleep. The pastor 
is to stay!” 
117 For centuries, Prussian kings sought to live up to the ideal of a Lutheran king, whose 
Calling was to be the “father of the country”. According to Martin Luther, a ruler and his high 
magistracy were bound to the principle of justification, hence religiously obliged to always seek 
the “just” and “righteous” way, as well. This aspect of Lutheranism did not only impose limits on 
the subject’s rights and duties vis-à-vis his ruler, but also accounted for the doctrine of “civil 
disobedience” when the ruler commanded the subject to act in evil or immoral ways. For details, 
see BERMAN, supra note 8, at 65.  
118 Forbath, supra note 98, at 1108. 
119 At the beginning of the 19th century (1817), Prussian Lutheran churches founded with 
other Protestant churches the Evangelical Church of Prussia, an equivalent to, for example, the 
United Church of Canada. 
120 See for example BERMAN, supra note 8, at 40: “The true church is not a lawmaking 
institution. It is, rather, the invisible community of all believers, in which all are priests , serving 
one another, and each is a “private person” in his relation to God. Each responds directly to the 
Bible as the Word of God.” 
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on a nation-wide level the state replaced the parish, while the parish remained 
important on the local level. Consequently, the church was expected to support the 
state (again, not the King!), and the state121 was supposed to fulfill the functions 
which were formally exercised by the parish, hence taking the responsibility for 
the poor and the weak. This implied a greater concern for the public good, and a 
lesser acknowledgment of individualism. In fact, the united Protestant Church in 
Prussia adopted more Lutheran than Calvinist values. This might explain the 
exodus of many Calvinists to North America in the time following this period. 
When Prussia merged in 1871 with Catholic states in southern Germany 
into the German Reich, the collectivist and interventionist business approach, 
which was consistent with both Lutheran and Catholicism, was retained (at least 
until the end of the First World War in 1918). Thus, even though the German 
population was diverse in times of industrialization, business politics were 
primarily interventionist and collectivist, -characteristics that are consistent with 
Lutheran and Catholic business ethics. However, the Calvinist influence may 
explain why market forces were not damned, per se, but kept under control – as is 
the pre-eminent type of regulation during the German Wirtschaftswunder in the 
second half of the 20th century, which has become famous under the term social 
economy.  
 
In the Netherlands, in contrast, Calvinism prevailed in business and 
economic development, driven by the Protestant conviction that “strenuous toil is 
acceptable to Heaven.” Proverbial have become “those Dutch Calvinists whose 
economic triumphs were as famous as their iron Protestantism – ‘thinking, sober, 
and patient men, and such as believe that labour and industry is their duty towards 
God.’”122 Meanwhile, the strong presence of atheists blurs the picture of Dutch 
Protestantism, which is probably due to the fact that the Dutch Reformed Church 
                                            
121 This aspect may explain why Germans and Americans associate different functions and 
characteristics with the expressions “the State” and “the Government”, for details see Ralf Michael 
& Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 
Duke Law School Legal Studies RPS No. 137, at 12-5 (2007). 
122 TAWNEY, supra note 100, at 211.  
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collects taxes from its members. Dutch Protestants traditionally live in the North 
of the country, in the industrious harbour cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the 
like, while Catholicism has its strong-hold in the agrarian regions of the South. 
 
While in Switzerland, Catholicism slightly prevails, almost equals the 
Protestant population in numbers, its 42.7% Protestant population with a strong 
Calvinist influence prevails in Swiss business ethics. The productive cities of 
Geneva, Bern, Zürich and Basel are primarily Calvinist regions (with Geneva 
being the first Calvinist city in the world), while primarily agrarian cantons 
represent the Catholic population.123 This proportion remained relatively stable 
over time as, apparently, Swiss population rarely migrates into cantons of a 
different cultural background.  
 D. The Evidence  
I. Historical Evidence 
1. From Medieval Times to Industrialization 
The aforementioned ethical differences with respect to market forces can 
be traced through philosophical and political literature.124 A brief look at the 
diverse fates of colonial undertakings, as well as the policy regarding speculative 
bubbles in corporate stocks in the years of 1719/1720 exemplifies the way in 
which religion has influenced corporate law development. 
First: the theory of a pro-business attitude in the Calvinistic belief is 
consistent with the success of colonial undertakings in the Netherlands and 
                                            
123 Schweizer Bundesamt für Statistik [Swiss Federal Agency for Statistics], 
Eidgenössische Volkszählung 2000 – Karte 3.1 [Results of the Swiss Census of the year 2000 – 
Map 3.1] at http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/porta.../publikationen.Document.69601.html  (February 
26, 2007).  
124 See, for example, the works by John Locke, John Stuart Mill, as well as BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN, NECESSARY HINTS TO THOSE THAT WOULD BE RICH (1736) and ADVICE TO A YOUNG 
TRADESMAN (1748), Works ed. Sparks Vol. II p. 87, against JEAN JAQUES ROUSSEAU, CONTRACT 
SOCIAL, I. 6. (1762) (emphasizing the “supreme direction of the general will”) at 
www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm (February 26, 2007). 
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England.125 While the Dutch and English East-India companies flourished for 
almost 200 years126 and laid the foundations for British and Dutch colonial 
empires, colonial companies from Catholic and Lutheran countries were all but 
successful. For example, the French East-India company, set up in 1624 and re-
named as such in 1664, quickly faltered because French Kings focused on 
Catholic missionary works, rather than on economic development and trade.127
Moreover, in the first quarter of the 18th century, a frenzy in corporate 
stocks developed. Starting in France, the Compagnie des Indes, magnetizing 
money from all over the continent, promised to invest in, and economically 
exploit, the area of New Orleans, which was a French colony in North 
America.128 At approximately the same time, the English South Sea Corporation, 
trying to mimic the wide success of the Compagnie des Indes, promised to exploit 
territories in the South Sea area. When both bubbles eventually burst, the French 
and English legislatures dealt with the speculation problem in different ways. The 
French tried to stabilize the precipitating stock prices by prohibiting trade in the 
stocks by various means.129 All of these measures were (futile) means of reducing 
the impact of market forces on investors and preventing them from experiencing 
catastrophic financial failures. In contrast, in accordance with the idea of 
predestination, English regulators strictly applied the caveat emptor principle, 
                                            
125 These, at times highly profitable, undertakings were organized in a structure that some 
authors deem the first joint-stock corporations. 
126 The former was founded March 20th 1602, received the right of perpetual existence in 
1623, and existed until struggles in the aftermath of the French revolution caused its end in 1795. 
The later dated back to 1613 (Blair Reforming Corporate Governance, supra note 62, holds it was 
founded in 1600), was perpetually incorporated in 1654, and was liquidated in 1858. 
127 See, e.g. Fick, supra note 66, at 45 (transl. by the author): „Rather than building 
fortresses, the company built Catholic churches; instead of farmers and merchants, priests were 
sent to the colonies. In fact, trade with pagans, living in the new territories, were prohibited. Thus, 
it was not surprising that the French East-India company … became insolvent in 1684, and 
creditors, as well as, shareholders were at the mercy of the majestic exchequer.” 
128 The details of the Mississippi-Bubble cannot be given here. The following abstract of 
events is taken from Fick, supra note 66, at 46; Peter Garber, Famous First Bubbles 4 J. Econ. 
Persp. 35 (1990). 
129 They included hindrance of exchange of stocks in real value assets, such as gold, 
restrictions of monetary export, as well as a mandatory amalgamation of Compagnie des Indes 
with the partially Crown-owned and financial stabile company Banque Royal. 
- 39 - 
resulting in spectacular scenes in the London financial district, involving 
bankruptcy and a number of investors committing suicide..130  
2. The Industrialization Period 
During the industrialization period, many instances reflect the then-
prevailing ethics in Anglo-America and Continental Europe. 
For example, the regulatory approach to freedom of incorporation in 
the 19th century reflects the market-friendly and market-hostile attitudes of 
Western law-makers. Aristocratic state laws had traditionally required an official 
state act for incorporation [concession system]. Given the enormous amounts of 
capital needed for industrialization, state bureaucracies faced the impossible task 
of estimating whether the prospective business was viable, dangerous, or 
potentially fraudulent, on the basis of papers that entrepreneurs presented when 
applying for concession. The United Kingdom replaced the concession system in 
1844.131 The early departure from concession to the contractual approach has 
been held to be an expression of the English sense of personal and economic 
liberalism,132 since – despite the prohibition of bearer shares – few restrictions 
applied. Given that 19th century English courts were not particularly concerned 
with minority shareholder protection,133 this liberal-individualistic approach 
catered to the economic interests of management and controlling shareholders. 
From the beginning (1789) at least until the Civil War, American states 
developed the tradition of local self-government and Jacksonian laissez-faire 
business policy.134 State chartering practice was (even) more liberal than in the 
                                            
130 The fiscus and the non-invested public, though, benefited from the burst of the bubble 
proportionally more than in France.  
131 The Joint Stock Companies Registration, Incorporation and Regulation Act of 1844 was 
upgraded in four legislative steps in the years of 1855 through 1858, and resulted in a system that 
forced business entities to disclose its limited liability by adding a “limited” to its name. See 
Mahoney, supra note 12, at 886-892. 
132 Fick, supra note 66, at 55-56. 
133 In Foss v. Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843), minority shareholder suits were 
restricted; in Harben v. Phillips, 23 Ch.D. 14 (1883), the Chancery Court denied shareholders a 
common law right for proxy voting. 
134 Forbath, supra note 98, at 1092. 
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U.K., given that the legislatures did not seek to protect favored corporations with 
a semi-public purpose through a restrictive chartering practice, with remarkable 
effects: By the mid-1820s, the English and American capital markets were about 
the same size, “even though the English had a century’s lead time.”135 By 1860, 
most American states had passed general incorporation statutes.136 Thus, in the 
19th century U.S. and U.K., market forces could work relatively unaffected by 
early state interference, which implies some early deference to the impact of 
market forces.  
The development in Continental Europe was entirely different. When 
France (in 1863 & 1867) and the Northern German states (in 1870) eventually 
receded from incorporation control,137 it was soon replaced by a strict mandatory 
scheme, rather than by a reliance on freedom of contract (which is today known as 
“enabling” or “contractarian theory”138 of corporate law). This interventionist 
policy is consistent with a perceived responsibility to protect whoever is deemed 
to be in an inferior economic position. 
 
Moreover, the predominant form of business that the polity furthered 
differed. French and German Policy makers tied entrepreneurs to their businesses 
through personal responsibility for the corporation’s debt. In contrast to the 
United States and the U.K., (some types of) partnerships flourished in France 
between 1840 and 1912.139 The fact that partnerships were the predominant 
                                            
135 Christian C. Day, Dispersed Capital and Moral Authority: The Paradox of Success in 
the Unregulated 19th Century New York Capital Markets, 12 L. & Bus. Rev. of the Americas 303, 
311 (2006); Peter L. Rousseau & Richard Sylla, Emerging Financial Markets and Early U.S. 
Growth, 41:4 Explorations in Economic History 1, 6 (2005). 
136 Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance, supra note 62, at 27. 
137 Werner Schubert, Die Abschaffung des Konzessionssystems durch die 
Aktienrechtsnovelle von 1870 (The elimination of the concession system through the stock 
corporation law reform of 1970) ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (ZGR) 1981, 
285, 292 ff.; SIEMS, CONVERGENCE, supra note 7, at 20 et seq. 
138 For a recent critique of this approach see Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory 
of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. Corp. L. 779, 781 (2006).  
139 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Contractual 
Flexibility: A Comparison of Business’s Organizational Choices in France and the United States 
during the Era of Industrialization 7:1 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 28, 35 (2005).  
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corporate form is consistent with my theory that Continental policy makers tended 
to hold business people in a fixed relationship to their business, and required them 
to bear responsibility for small shareholders and employees. The “winner-takes-
all” rule that was prevalent in the United States in the same period of time140 was 
antithetical to the Continental approach based on responsibility for the weak and 
poor. 
 
Similarly, the French politician and famous Huguenot François Guizot141 
became eternal in the French memory with his quote “Enrichez Vous!” (Enrich 
yourself!), meant as a measure to spur economic activity in France. In the 
Calvinist-Puritan United States, this quotation would have hardly persisted for 
eternity. In order to demonstrate the distance between this Calvinist statement and 
Catholic ethics of the same time period, the reasons for the Catholic business man 
Melvissen, the founder of the first German banking corporation, decided to choose 
the corporate form, are particularly illuminating. Melvissen was not only 
appreciative of the corporate form due to the intense relationship between capital 
and entrepreneurial spirit, but also because of its social functions. He believed that 
the corporation was a collectivist organisation in the sense of social ethics being 
able to counter destructive radicalism. In particular, Melvissen hoped to mitigate 
the extreme forces of individualism by choosing the corporate form. In order to 
ensure the shareholders’ responsibility, Melvissen preferred registered shares over 
bearer shares.142
 
Moreover, the diaries of (Pietist-Lutheran) Otto von Bismarck - the long-
term chancellor of the German Reich in the second half of the 19th century - reveal 
                                            
140 See, for example, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation 
Statutes 22 Wash. U. L. Rev. 305, 337 (1937). 
141 François Guizot (1787-1874), a French academic politician, served the French King 
Louis Philippe as minister of public instruction (1832-37). He was highly influential after 1840 
and became premier in 1847. His government was overthrown in February 1848.  
142 Transl. by the author from HANDBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN GESCHICHTE III [MANUAL OF 
GERMAN HISTORY, PT. 3] 382 (Bruno Gebhardt & Herbert Grundmann eds., 8th Ed., Stuttgart 
1960).  
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that his social insurance laws of 1884 were, on the one hand, a strategic strike 
against social democracy, which gained more and more support in the second half 
of the 19th century. On the other hand, he accounted for his actions from a 
religious point of view. To the same extent that aristocracy had traditionally 
provided food and shelter on religious grounds to the old and weak, thereby 
fulfilling their religious-based responsibility vis-à-vis their followers,143 
industrialists were to take on responsibility for those who had sacrificed their lives 
and health to the industrialist’s business. 
  
In 1891, Pope Leo XIII issued his Encyclical “Rerum Novarum”144 in 
which he deals with the social question. The social question comprises the 
problem of how policy makers should deal with the problems that 
industrialization brought to Europe, including mass poverty, exploitation of 
woman and kids by greedy industrialists and, as a response, the rise of socialism. 
Given their disregard for religion, Pope Leo XIII felt compelled to counter the 
socialists. Thus, on the one hand, the Pope praises property145 - in the tradition of 
Thomas Acquinas’ law of nature - as it grants the wage-earner the power of 
disposal that ownership obtains. On the other hand, he emphasized that  
if a family finds itself in exceeding distress, utterly deprived of the counsel of 
friends, and without prospect of extricating itself, it is right that extreme 
necessity be met by public aid, since each family is a part of the commonwealth. 
In like manner, if within the precincts of the household there occur grave 
disturbance[s] of mutual rights, public authority should intervene to force each 
party to yield to the other its proper due; for this is not to deprive citizens of 
their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them.146  
                                            
143 Martin Luther admonishes in his letter An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation [To 
the Christian Nobility of German Nation] German aristocracy to take on its responsibilities for 
their dependents, drawing on Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount.  
144 Supra note 73.  
145 Supra note 73, No. 5-13. 
146 Supra note 73, No. 14. 
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Pope Leo XIII further noted that the wealthy and the working men are not 
destined by nature to live in mutual conflict: 
Just as the symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable 
arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State is it ordained by 
nature that these two classes should dwell in harmony and agreement ….147  
In particular, Leo XIII underlined the duties of the firm owner: 
… but to misuse men as though they were things in the pursuit of gain, or to 
value them solely for their physical powers - that is truly shameful and inhuman. 
Again justice demands that, in dealing with the working man, religion and the 
good of his soul must be kept in mind. […] Doubtless, before deciding whether 
wages axe fair, many things have to be considered; but wealthy owners and all 
masters of labor should be mindful of this - that to exercise pressure upon the 
indigent and the destitute for the sake of gain, and to gather one's profit out of 
the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine.148  
From a Calvinist point of view, “Rerum Novarum” takes the same interventionist 
and collectivist approach as traditional Catholic doctrine. Despite its 
acknowledgment of private property and religion, commentators have seen 
significant similarities between socialist and Catholic business ethics.149 
Similarly, the Lutheran German Emperor Wilhelm II is believed to have said: “I 
would personally like socialists if they were not seeking to replace myself!” These 
collectivist Catholic and Lutheran ethics were influential on economic policy in 
Continental Europe, and – to a lesser degree – in England and in Canada. 
 
At the same time, in the U.S. Calvinist-based individualism (which was politically 
reflected in the “Classical Liberalism”) could maintain its dominance against 
                                            
147 Supra note 73, No. 19, contuining “… so as to maintain the balance of the body. Each 
needs the other: capital cannot do without labor nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement 
results in the beauty of good order, while perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and 
savage barbarity.” 
148 Supra note 73, No. 20. 
149 See Lipset, supra note 91, at 65-7. 
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collectivist and social minded Progressives until the 20th century’s Great 
Depression, despite mass immigration from non-WASP-countries, increasingly 
bitter inequalities and class conflicts.150 Even though classical liberals were 
equally alarmed by labor’s and farmers’ desire for state protection and by the 
unprecedented power of the merging large corporations, - legal liberalism, 
believing that competition was the natural order of economic life, maintained that 
“[t]he state and the law had to be reclaimed from capture by private interests, 
whether of labor or capital”151 - it was at the heart of classical liberal doctrine to 
protect a free and competitive market place. In the post-civil-war-U.S., it did so 
with the help of the judiciary which construed the common law legal principle of 
“equality”, hence equal rights and equal opportunities, formally, rather than 
factually: Every individual was assumed to have the same rights and 
opportunities, regardless of his/her economic position. Thus, the courts felt 
compelled to secure that lawmaking was free from class domination by the rich 
few or the property-less many.152 Economically, the liberal approach meant 
abstention from social legislation and thereby (indirectly) furthering the 
aggrandizement of capital in big corporations, whose fate laid in the hands of the 
(rapidly developing) capital markets. Thus, distrust in state-administration and 
centralized order effectively resulted in a policy which favored grandiosity and 
enabled “the new private leviathans to prevail.”153  
The infamous struggle between egotistic investors – the more popular expression 
“robber barons” would not stand close scrutiny – and similarly egotistic 
investment bankers (such as J. P. Morgan) which sought to protect the reputation 
of their business (administering money for European investors) against the 
                                            
150 Forbath, supra note 98, at 1092. 
151 Forbath, supra note 98, at 1097. 
152 Forbath, supra note 98, at 1100, citing examples of state and federal courts striking out 
anti-labor, anti-work protection and other social legislation, Lochner v. New York (1905) being a 
prominent example. 
153 Forbath, supra note 98, at 1118. 
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former,154 is evidence for that tendency. Whether state legislatures did not want, 
or could not interfere with these developments, is unclear. However, it was 
exactly these conflicts which spurred innovation on the financial markets, 
resulting in essentially private investor protection through financial intermediaries 
and qualitative listing standards of stock exchanges (NYSE).155 Rather than 
collectivist state protectionism (as in Continental Europe), it was the initiative of 
wealthy, powerful and – potentially - greedy individuals that shaped the design of 
corporate America in the 19th century. These developments are consistent with my 
ethical findings above. 
3. Continuation in 20th Century Politics 
In the 20th century, the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 
from 1949, the political roots of co-determination after World War II, and the 
refusal to implement the suggestions contained in the Segrè-Report by the French 
and German governments, are milestones in a chain of events that show the 
significant impact of ethics on corporate law development in Continental Europe. 
First: Article 14 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 
[Grundgesetz] provides constitutional protection for property rights to which the 
rights of share owners belong.156 Articles 14 (1) and (2) hold:  
(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and 
limits shall be defined by the laws. 
(2) Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.  
                                            
154 The literature on this part of American history is extensive. See, for a contemporary 
overview, Day, supra note 135, at 327. 
155 See EDMUND C. STEDMAN, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE; IT’S HISTORY, IT’S 
CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL PROSPERITY, AND IT’S RELATION TO AMERICAN FINANCE AT THE 
OUTSET OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (New York, Stock exchange historical company, 1905; ; 
reprinted New York: Greenwood Press, 1969). For an overview of the early developments see 
Stuart Banner, Origins of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27:1 J. Leg. St. 113 (1998). 
156 This is constant judicature of the German Constitutional Court, see BVerfGE 4, 7, 30 – 
Investitionshilfe -; BVerfGE 13, 363 – Feldmühle -; BVerfGE 25, 371 – Rheinstahl -; BVerfGE 
50, 290 – Mitbestimmung. 
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Furthermore, according to Article 20 (1) of the Grundgesetz, Germany is a 
democratic and social federal republic. Articles 14 and 20 are the result of a 
consensus of the constitutional convent at Herrenchiemsee in 1948. A lay public 
would assume that this provision is derived from socialist ideas. This is not, in 
fact, the case. After the breakdown of the Third Reich, all democratic groups 
assembled in order to negotiate the provisions of the Grundgesetz. The most 
influential group was the Catholic Christian group157 centered around Konrad 
Adenauer (who would later become chancellor). Adenauer’s belief was rooted in 
the Catholic social ethics of the 19th century, developed by Steguweit, Wilhelm 
Marx, and Windhorst.158 The main achievement of Catholic social ethics was to 
distill from the Christian ideal of charity [clemencia] an obligation of the state and 
its members to support the weaker parts of society, which - in times of 
industrialization - meant to protect them from the impact of market forces. This 
approach was consistent with Lutheran beliefs and Germanic traditions, and also 
found support in left-wing groups, such as the social democrats. Thus, Christian 
roots underpin the ideological fundament of the German “social economy.” The 
Ahlen-Program of the Christian Democratic Union of 1947 reflects this 
fundament: 
Capitalists striving for profit and power can no longer constitute the essence and 
objective of this social and economic renewal; it will have to be the well-being 
of our nation. By adopting a cooperative economic order, the German people 
shall obtain an economic and social constitution which is commensurate with 
the rights and dignity of man, serves the spiritual and material reconstruction of 
our nation, and secures peace at home and abroad.159
                                            
157 The German Catholics were traditionally organized in the “Zentrums-Partei”, which was 
renamed the Christian Democratic Union [CDU]. 
158 For an introductory overview in English see MARY FULLBROOK, A CONCISE HISTORY OF 
GERMANY 131, 205 – 219 (2nd ed. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004) (this specific 
strain of belief is called “Rheinischer Katholizismus” [Catholicism of the Rhine area, referring to a 
predominantly Catholic, and traditionally wealthy, part of Western Germany.]  
159 Translation from YONATHAN RESHEF, “GERMANY”, at courses.bus.ualberta.ca/orga417-
reshef/germany.htm#republic  (February 26, 2007). 
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Second: In the years 1951 through 1956, the Christian Conservatives under 
Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhardt and Alfred Müller-Armack implemented (in 
coalition with the Liberals) co-determination regimes.160 While co-determination 
was partially intended to be a device used to control industrialists, who had 
supported the Third-Reich Nazi-regime,161 it was also well aligned with the 
doctrine of ensuring corporate social responsibility (Property entails obligations!) 
and Catholic doctrine. German Social-democrats, who first participated in 
government in the late 1960s, did not create the co-determination regimes in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, instead they expanded them in the 1970s.162 In 
fact, worker co-determination was first (voluntarily) employed by Catholic 
capitalists of Western Germany in the second half of the 19th century.163
 
Third,: 
 “Christian democratic parties … with powerful Catholic influence behind 
them, promoted [a] closer European Union: the existing social order was to be 
saved by a reaffirmation of Christian values in social welfare and rationalized by 
cosmopolitan big business.”164
                                            
160 For details on Germany’s co-determination regimes see supra note 33. 
161 RESHEF, “GERMANY”, supra note 159, at IV., describes the deconcentration policy 
regarding “heavy industries”; Thomas Raiser, The theory of enterprise law in the Federal Republic 
of Germany 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 111, 118 (1988) emphasises the teamwork effect of co-
determination. 
162 The common interpretation of various authors, for example Hansman & Kraakman, The 
End, supra note 6, at 443 et seq., that workers’ codetermination was an achievement of social 
democrats or the political left is inaccurate. The fact that a political precursor was enacted in the 
1920s in efforts to co-opt revolutionary forces (by social democrats) [see Raiser, id.., at 117] does 
not explain why a conservative party enacted a co-determination regime in the 1950s. More 
accurate ROE, supra note 1, at 214: “Germany had an ideological tradition of co-determination, 
dating from the nineteenth century, when religious groups championed it to soften capitalism, to 
foster a workplace community without socialism.” Confusing, however, his categorization in 
MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – POLITICAL CONTEXT, 
CORPORATE IMPACT 92, 151 (OUP UK 2003).  
163 The “Brandt’sche Fabrikordnung” (transl. Rules for the fabrication plant owned by 
Brandt) in 1890, a code voluntarily adopted by the owner of the plant, the practicing Catholic 
Brandt, contained a workers body that provided advice to the owner and decided on certain matters 
with relevance to workers. 
164 BOWLE, supra note 8, at 337. 
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The reaction of European states to the Segrè-report165 in the 1960s, which 
guided the trajectory of Continental European corporate governance, is consistent 
with John Bowle’s above statement. The Segrè-report strongly recommended the 
development of capital market law, in order to strengthen economic development 
and competition in the (then) European Economic Community [EEC]. The 
governments of Continental European nations, however, decided to harmonize 
and strengthen corporate law by strengthening explicit shareholder rights, rather 
than by establishing a uniform capital market law. This decision is consistent with 
the doctrine of the German Stock Corporation Reform Act of 1965, which 
reduced directorial deference, which the leadership-oriented Stock Corporation 
Act of 1937, tainted by Nazi-ideology, had embedded within the Act.166 This 
decision was not revised until the United Kingdom entered into the EEC in 1973. 
 
 In the U.S., the twentieth century brought regulation of business, but 
remained, relatively speaking, a liberal economy. Even Roosevelt’s collectivist 
New Deal policy – which American Catholics strongly supported167 – does not 
shatter my theory behind distinction between market-friendly and market-hostile 
economies, for three reasons: First, the New Deal policy was established after the 
height of industrialization. At this point in time, financial institutions had reached 
significant maturity.168 Second: the New Deal policy and, in particular, Securities 
Regulation was officially implemented to provide a fair securities market through 
a greater level of disclosure (rather than to interfere with market forces 
                                            
165 EEC-COMMISSION (ED.), BUILDING A EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET – REPORT OF AN 
EXPERT GROUP OF THE EEC COMMISSION (Brussels 1966) (hereinafter Segrè-Report). 
166 Raiser, supra note 161, at 117, refers esp. to s. 70 GSCA of 1937. 
167 See Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought 
1:2 J. of Cath. Soc. Thought (2004), at IV., with further references. Pursuant to Barry Cushman, 
The Great Depression and the New Deal in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA sub I, 
at 14, (Tomlins & Grossbergs, eds., forthcoming 2007) Jewish and Catholic lawyers facing 
discrimination in private employment were particular beneficiaries of the expanded administration 
in the New Deal era. 
168 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the 20th Century (NBER WP 8178, Cambridge, MA: 2001) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract =236100. 
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themselves).169 Still today, few U.S. securities laws impose requirements other 
than disclosure duties and anti-fraud rules (and related sanctions). Third: the New 
Deal was a period-specific event. The fact that opposing political forces after 
Roosevelt’s resignation could dissolve significant parts of the welfare 
administration170 is evidence for the thesis that - other than social policy in 
collectivist Germany and France - the New Deal was not based on a social 
consensus.  
 
Similarly, the fact that, in the second half of the 20th century, the British 
labor governments strengthened the social welfare system does not challenge my 
proposition, for two reasons.171 First: I hold that the decisive step was made at the 
height of industrialization, hence in the U.K. in the early 19th century. In the mid-
twentieth century, the British financial system was already very advanced172 and 
British corporate law was working for more than a century. Second: since 
Margaret Thatcher could gather significant support for her turn-around policy in 
the early 1980’s, it is reasonable to assume that Labor’s expanding of the welfare 
state was not based on a social consensus. This argument becomes even more 
convincing when the recent struggles for reform of the welfare state in collectivist 
Germany and France are taken into account.  
 
Eventually, even Friedrich A. Hayek underscores the difference between 
an understanding of individualism that is bound by the limits that society 
provides, and “true” individualism (of which Hayek was fond).173 While French 
                                            
169 Cushman, supra note 167, sub I., at 10; this aspect spurred criticism by corporate 
finance experts at the time of the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933, see SELIGMAN, supra note 
63, at 71. 
170 SELIGMAN, supra note 63, at 213 et seq. 
171 This trend was sharply reversed under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. Today, there is 
very little rightfully deserving of the name social welfare system in the U.K. 
172 Rajan & Zingales, supra note 168. 
173 Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism: True and False in: INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC 
ORDER 8-9 (The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1948). Hayek tracks this strain of 
thought through Anglo-American philosophy, including John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, David 
Hume, Josiah Tucker, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke. 
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and German authors have typically endorsed the former, Anglo-American authors 
have generally hailed the latter. Thus, different market ethics prevailed in Anglo-
America and in France and Germany. 
 
II. ‘Legal’ Evidence 
Some differences between Anglo-American and Continental European 
corporate governance systems are consistent with my finding.  
For example, shareholder rights differ across the jurisdictions; in 
particular, the American corporate governance system assigns significant 
deference to managerial discretion,174 while French and German law traditionally 
assigns significant influence to the shareholder meeting, in order to balance 
management influence.175 Thus, in 2005, the legal regimes in France and 
Germany facilitated shareholder monitoring without replacing management. 
Thereby the laws of Canada and the United States reduced the function of 
shareholder meetings to an institution dealing almost exclusively with change-in-
control contests. The United Kingdom and Switzerland stood between these 
extremes.176 A weak state coupled with deference to market forces is consistent 
with Calvinism-Puritanism, which prevailed in Anglo-America, while a strong 
state that aims at balancing and directing the influence of economic power on 
society is consistent with the Roman-Catholic and Lutheran-Protestant belief. I 
hold that the inability of minority shareholders in the U.S. to exercise meaningful 
                                            
174 See Rock & Wachter, supra note 51. However, the business judgement rule which Rock 
& Wachter cite as example is also widely accepted in European corporate law. 
175 Already in the 17th century, French “general assemblies” were dominant. Thus, from the 
beginning, French and German corporate forms were closer to the “Partnership-ideal” than early 
British and American corporations. See Bonde, S. 16*; Fischer, Die Aktiengesellschaft (The 
Corporation) in EHRENBERGS HANDBUCH DES GESAMTEN HANDELSRECHTS III/1 [EHRENBERG’S 
MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAW, PT. III-1) 19 et seq. (1916); Lehmann, Entwicklung*, S. 62 f. 
176 See studies by Zetzsche, “Explicit and Implicit System”, supra note 43 and “Shareholder 
interaction”, supra note 46. In 2007, Anglo-America is facilitating day-to-day shareholder 
monitoring significantly: The SEC allowed for the internet-based distribution of proxy materials. 
The British Companies Act 2006, which received Royal Assent on November 8, 2006 (available at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006/index.html (February 27, 2007)) also seeks to facilitate the 
use of internet-based technology in shareholder meetings.  
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oversight over management other than through a costly management turnover 
reflects the U.S.-American assumption that capital markets are (semi-strong form) 
efficient. Canada, under the influence of the U.S. Securities Regulation, adopted 
similar rules, though Canadian idiosyncracies might have supported a different 
type of regime. (This is particularly true as the Canadian Supreme Court in his 
recent Peoples-decision, focusing of the pre-insolvency period, decided against 
the U.S.-style shareholder supremacy model and in favour of a more collectivist 
approach.).177 In contrast, in France and in Germany, weak capital markets and 
relatively concentrated share ownership mandated that minority shareholders have 
the capacity to directly influence directors and large shareholders, as a substitute 
for the restraining influence of capital markets. With respect to British and Swiss 
corporations, I found that the laws did not show clear preferences. 
These results are consistent with my ethical theory stated above, when 
adjusted to modern times. Given the values that I assigned to the prevailing 
religious denominations above, France and Germany are more collectivist, while 
the United States is more individualistic. The religious proportions in the U.K. 
and Switzerland can also explain why these countries stand between the 
collectivist and individualistic societies. Canada constitutes an exception. 
However, I have previously indicated the reasons for Canadian adherence to 
market forces, which is access to the liquid American capital markets. American 
regulators require a certain degree of legal convergence as a precondition for 
accepting such institutions as the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System 
(MJDS).178  
 
Moreover, it is consistent with my Ethical Theory that, in the U.S., brokers 
may exercise voting rights on behalf of their clients without having previously 
                                            
177 Supra note 111, with further references. 
178 The MJDS enables Canadian firms to fulfill they disclosure duties under U.S. law 
through filing reports governed under Canadian law and filed in the Canadian SEDAR base (the 
Canadian equivalent of EDGAR). 
- 52 - 
received any directions as to how they should vote,179 and that 10-20 percent of 
the shareholder votes are simply lost in the British chain of intermediaries which 
leads from the company, over the registrar and the brokers to the shareholders’ 
accounts.180  
 
The greater tolerance of Anglo-America towards hostile takeovers181 also 
fits into the picture, as a hostile takeover contest is essentially a market process: 
Which of the parties can credibly communicate to the shareholders a higher 
return? Catholic and Lutheran values, such as the responsibility to workers and 
society, are typically a minor concern in these transactions. 
 
I also find that Katharina Pistor’s legal ground rules are consistent with 
my theory.182 Professor Pistor holds that there are liberal market economies 
(LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). She shows that there are 
                                            
179 A “broker non-vote” generally occurs when a registered broker, who holds securities in 
street name, has not received voting instructions from his customer having beneficial ownership in 
the securities. For details see NYSE Rule 451,452, Amex Rule 576, 577, and NASD Rule 2260. 
Pursuant to NYSE Rule 452, “[a] member organization which has transmitted proxy soliciting 
material to the beneficial owner of stock … and solicited voting instructions in accordance with 
the provisions of Rule 451, and which has not received instructions from the beneficial owner … 
by the date specified in the statement accompanying such material, may give or authorize the 
giving of a proxy to vote such stock, provided the person in the member organization giving or 
authorizing the giving of the proxy has no knowledge of any contest as to the action to be taken at 
the meeting and provided such  action  is  adequately  disclosed  to  stockholders  and  does  not  
include  authorization  for  a  merger, consolidation or any other matter which may affect 
substantially the rights or privileges of such stock.” Rule 402.08 of the NYSE Listed Company 
Manual defines which proposals may affect substantially these rights. Issuers must report these 
broker non-votes in Item 4 of Part II of Form 10-Q. 
180 See Paul Myners, “Review of the impediments to voting UK shares – report to the 
Shareholder Voting Working Group” (1/2004) at http://www.manifest.co.uk/myners/myners.htm 
(February 27, 2007). The situation is expected to improve with the adoption of the Companies Act 
2006, see supra note 176. 
181 See for example Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1253, 1287 (1999). In Germany, before the takeover by Mannesmann AG by British 
Vodafone Plc., not a single hostile takeover attempt succeeded (despite a lack of legal takeover 
defences in German corporate law). Due to British influence, the European Takeover Directive 
(Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12-23) is 
imposing a liberal approach, in relative terms, requiring fair competition among multiple offerors.  
182 Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies in 
Corporate Governance in CONTEXT CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, 
AND THE U.S., Pt. III., No. 13 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch & Hideka Kanda & Harald 
Baum eds. OUP: UK 2005) 
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social preferences reflected in basic norms, called ground rules. These ground 
rules became part of a society’s legal systems. Today, they can be found in 
substantive and procedural laws. In particular, with respect to substantive rules, 
LMEs (which are primarily common law countries) adhere to liberal 
contractibility and the primacy of individual preference; with respect to 
procedural default rules, LME-societies believe in universal justiciability and 
individual initation rights for civil procedures. In contrast, CMEs condition the 
freedom to contract on the adherence to social norms, or limit it by mandatory 
provision that reflect these social norms. Further, CMEs provide for selective 
justiciability and collective initiation rights. As an example for substantive rules, 
Pistor mentions that “private contracts are valid unless they violate procedural 
rules and are in “bad faith””, while CMEs require contractors to act in “good 
faith”, which imposes an ethical standard on the parties. With respect to 
procedural default rules, Pistor believes that individual initiation rights are typical 
for LMEs, while the fact that individual litigation rights are limited and frequently 
delegated to the collective and/or a neutral agent is reflective of CMEs. Pistor 
holds that the aforementioned legal provisions reflect social preferences. 
 This paper could add the aspect that Pistor voluntarily refrained from 
examining.183 That is: what prompted societies to adhere to the specific social 
preferences, hence ethics, in question? The above ground rules are consistent with 
my ethical explanations of corporate governance development: In Pistor’s 
terminology, Catholic and Lutheran countries are typically CMEs, while Calvinist 
countries tend to be LMEs. Interestingly, Canada – a country with both a strong 
Catholic and Calvinist population – is something in between an LME and a CME.  
III. Empirical Evidence 
As my ethical theory regards both law and ethics, two types of data can, in theory, 
support or refute my thesis. First, specific corporate governance data, showing 
that the “responsibility” idea that I generated from Catholic and Lutheran ethics 
                                            
183 Id., at 8. 
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does or does not, in fact, exist; second, data showing the general values prevailing 
in different societies. 
1. Corporate Governance Data 
 If there was – for whatever reason – a greater level of explicit shareholder 
influence in France and Germany, and a greater level of implicit shareholder 
influence in Anglo-America, one would assume that current corporate practice 
should provide some empirical evidence, particularly with regard to the two key 
assumptions of the Ethical Theory presented above. 
  
First: if capital market control constitutes the core component of Anglo-
American shareholder influence, there is likely some evidence that capital 
markets are more strongly developed in the United States than in Continental 
Europe. This first point has been sufficiently examined in former studies to which 
I refer.184  
Second: since, according to the foregoing, shareholder meetings constitute 
the center of the Explicit System, one would assume that there exists some 
empirical evidence that French and German shareholders are more active through 
shareholder meetings than are Anglo-American investors. This is, in fact, the case: 
the attendance rate, measured in votes, at shareholder meetings of the 30 largest 
German public companies is similar to the attendance rates at those of U.S. 
American companies, after adjustment for foreign ownership and non-broker 
votes. However, other figures signal the greater relevance of shareholder meetings 
in Germany, in particular the (1) greater personal attendance of shareholders at 
the meeting, (2) the reporting structure, and (3) the average length of shareholder 
meetings.185  
                                            
184 For example, Coffee, The Rise, supra note 1, at 15 et seq; Rajan & Zingales, supra note 
168; Zetzsche, supra note 43, at B.III.3. a) (with some minor difference in the data as compared to 
Coffee’s data that are taken from a Dutch dissertation). 
185 Zetzsche, supra note 43, at B.III.3. b) and c). 
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These results are consistent with Dunlavy’s research, which examines 
when, and why, the power of individual shareholders has become proportional to 
their investment, when the “one share - one vote” principle became widely 
accepted.186 Originally, the shareholder was not deemed the owner of a portion of 
capital, but a “member” of the corporation and therefore an equal among equals. 
Hence, at the beginning of the century, virtually all, and in 1855, approximately 
38% of the U.S.-American corporations were subject to this “democratic” 
approach, while already 35% of the U.S.-American corporations were 
incorporated with the plutocratic “one share – one vote” principle. In France and 
Germany, the “one share – one vote” principle was virtually unknown until the 
end of the 19th century. While in 1884, “one share – one vote” became the default 
rule in Germany, charter practice was apparently different. Comparing the 
German and the American Law, in 1907, a commentator regarded German 
corporate law to be “exceptionally” democratic (in that sense). 187 The British law 
that was similar to the American state laws until the 1860’s established in the 
second half of the 19th century a default rule somewhere in between the 
democratic and plutocratic approach. These findings are consistent with the 
ethical theory shown herein as the (Catholic) French and (Catholic/Lutheran) 
German laws held economic power by large shareholders at bay by virtue of a 
“democratic” voting pattern, while Calvinism which was prevalent in the U.S. at 
that time was more open to the exercise of economic power. Even the British 
compromise fits into that scheme, as its population was partly fond of, and partly 
hostile to the exercise of market forces. 
 
                                            
186 Colleen A. Dunlavy, “From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-century Shareholder 
Voting Rights and Theories of the Corporation”, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA – 
HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE 66, 72, 84-85 (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., OUP 
2004) and Corporate Governance in Late 19th-Century Europe and the U.S. – The Case of 
Shareholder Voting Rights in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (Klaus J. Hopt et al., 
eds. Clarendon, Oxford: 1998). 
187 RICHARD PASSOW, DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE BEDEUTUNG UND ORGANISATION DER 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [THE ECONOMIC MEANING AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STOCK 
CORPORATION] 201 (Jena, Gustav Fischer 1907). 
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Further, the data showing Scandinavian countries ahead in the statistics 
with respect to exploitation of shareholders by management or controlling 
shareholders188 is consistent with Lutheran ethics. This is due to the fact that, on 
the one hand, Lutheran ethics require the believer to be responsible for the well-
being of his followers (the traditional Catholic part of Lutheran belief), and on the 
other hand, imposes duties of hard, strenuous labor and accountability towards the 
parish (the communitarian-Protestant part of Lutheran belief) on management and 
controlling shareholders. 
It is interesting to see predominantly Catholic countries failing so 
miserably in these statistics. For example, these statistics show that in France the 
total vote value as a share of firm value is significantly lower than in any Lutheran 
or Calvinist country. These statistics have merely been interpreted from a 
perspective regarding the question as to which family of law (?), either civil or 
common law, these countries belong, rather than to which strains of belief prevail 
in each country. Even Stulz & Williamson, who examined the interrelation of 
religion, culture and finance,189 neglected the difference between the opposing 
market ethics of Lutheranism and Calvinism, thus mixing further alternative 
Protestant strains of belief with respect to market ethics.  
Professor Coffee used these statistics to state: “The real surprise that 
emerges … is the inferior performance of the French civil law countries.”190 My 
ethical theory can provide a sound explanation for the inferior performance of 
France. Let me start with some anecdotal evidence. I come from a wealthy, 
formerly Catholic region in Western Germany, the Rhein area. The sloppiness of 
my region’s population as well as that of the equally Catholic Bavarians is 
proverbial in Germany, as compared to the selective Lutheran and Calvinist 
regions in the Southwest and the North of Germany. One explanation for this is 
that Catholic ethics are more tolerant with respect to irregularities in business 
                                            
188 Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country 
Analysis  (2000) at http://ssrn.com/papers/abstract=237809 (February 27, 2007). 
189 Stulz & Williamson, supra note 71.  
190 Coffee, Do norms matter?, supra note 52, at 2162. 
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behaviour (as compared to the strict and intolerant Calvinist and Lutheran ethics) 
under the premise that management and controlling shareholders still fulfill their 
tasks to further the common good. The Catholic practice of absolution, which may 
be achieved from Priests as a reward for prayer and beneficial behaviour191 is, 
generally speaking, a tolerant principle. Protestants do not know an equivalent, as 
only faith matters and “forgiveness of sins can be granted only through a direct 
confrontation between the repentant sinner and God, by divine grace alone, 
without rules and procedures.”192 Thus, the Protestant sinner must permanently 
live in a state of terrifying uncertainty as to whether God will forgive his sins and 
grant him access to paradise. 
This explanation of Catholics’ tolerance with respect to failures, in 
general, may find support in the societal organizations of Protestant communities: 
Protestants did not have a centralized institution (as did the Catholic Church) that 
exercised spiritual control over the members of the parish. Instead, the parish 
itself is expected to exert control over its members193 and assist them to become 
“just” and “righteous”, in the sight of God.194 The fact that a merchant was 
responsible to the parish for his actions is likely to have furthered the general 
willingness of Protestants to accept accountability vis-à-vis others. Still today, the 
term accountability “may invoke strong religious connotations”195 among native 
English speakers. A similar earthly every-day accountability does not exist in the 
Catholic belief, since the Catholic Church (hence, the institution) exercised the 
spiritual control of which the New Testament requires from the Christian.196  
It is important to note, however, that this doctrine does not allow Catholics 
to steal. Instead it means that, within the limits provided by mortal sins, relief may 
                                            
191 In medieval times, abuses included the sale of indulgences. See BERMAN, supra note 
13, at 8: “The pope claimed the power to intercede with God on behalf of sinners in order to remit 
punishments that otherwise would be inflicted upon them in purgatory after death …” 
192 BERMAN, supra note 8, at 41. 
193 BERMAN, supra note 8, at 180, 190. 
194 For the pivotal Protestant doctrine of “justification” see BERMAN, supra note 8, at 41. 
195 Licht, Accountability, supra note 55, sub 3. 
196 See Proverbs 27:17: “As iron sharpens iron, so one man sharpens another.” Galatians 
6:1: “Brothers, if someone is caught in a sin, you who are spiritual should restore him gently.” 
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be granted on earth for sins that, from an individual point of view, justify a failure 
to abide by the rules. The counterpart of this doctrine is being generous and 
helpful to the poor – a function which is exercised by the Catholic church on 
behalf of the individual Christian. The English language provides interesting 
evidence to this aspect of Catholicism as catholicity equally means 
‘permissiveness’ and ‘generosity’. The statistics mentioned above are, insofar, 
somewhat lopsided as they only measure permissiveness, and not generosity. 
2. Value-Related Data 
Culture is understood as the values, orientations and underlying 
assumptions that are prevalent among the members of a society.197 Given that the 
ways in which societal institutions function express cultural priorities, “religion is 
a convenient proxy for culture.” 198 Hence, studies measuring societal preferences 
may shed further light on my proposition. In this regard, it is particularly helpful 
that sociologists and psychologists agree that cultural orientations remain 
relatively stable and change takes place over time spans of decades and 
centuries.199 In societal preferences, the imprint of ancient intellectual legacies 
and historical initial conditions may be preserved.200 Thus, even though value-
related data, with regard to the industrialization period is not available, data 
regarding today’s values of societies examined herein may provide some evidence 
to my thesis.  
The reliability of these studies, however, is limited: Firstly, given the 
diversity of what people associate with certain value-embedding words, there are 
                                            
197 Licht, Accountability, supra note 55, sub 5.2. 
198 Licht et al., Culture, Law, supra note 10, sub I. and The Maximands, supra note 48, at 
658. 
199 Licht, Goldschmidt & Schwartz, supra note 55, sub I., V.; Mitchell, supra note 53, at 
222. 
200 Shalom H. Schwartz & Maria Ros, Values in the West: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Challenge to the Individualism-Collectivism Cultural Dimension 1 World Psychologie 99 (1995); 
Ronald Inglehart & Wayne Baker, Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of 
Traditional Values 65 Am. Sociological Rev. 19 (2000); Shalom Schwartz, Anat Bardi & Gabriel 
Bianchi, Value Adaptation to the Imposition and Collapse of Communist Regimes in East-Central 
Europe, in POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY: CULTURAL AND CRISS-CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS 217 
(Stanley A. Renshon & John Duckitt, eds. Macmillan 2000). 
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significant restrictions resulting from statistics measuring value sets. Further, most 
empirical studies on norms that examine cross-national preferences, either legal or 
cultural, with regard to religion, do not distinguish between the different strains of 
Protestantism prevailing in each country, nor do they account for the situation in 
which there is no one prevailing strain of religious belief, as we observe in 
Canada, Switzerland and Germany.201 Thus, these studies are prone to miss the 
complexity of religious diversity, even among Western countries. Finally, most 
empirical studies draw on the classification by, and results of, La Porta et al.,202 
which are deficient in numerous respects.203  
Considering empirical studies (if only in a very careful manner) 
nevertheless asserts my proposition: Stultz and Williamson find that creditor rights 
are weaker in catholic countries.204 Notwithstanding that Djankov, McLiesh and 
Shleifer205 do not confirm this result, it would at least not challenge the 
proposition herein, as a more tolerant Catholic approach towards accountability 
may go along with a lower moral pressure to pay one’s debt. Daniel Treismann 
reports a negative correlation between Protestantism and perceived corruption.206 
                                            
201 This is true with respect to research undertaken by Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, 
Andrei Shleifer, Private Credit in 129 Countries (2005) NBER Working Paper 11078; Licht, 
Goldschmidt & Schwartz, supra note 55; Licht et al., Culture, Law, supra note 10, at 229; Stultz & 
Williamson, supra note 71; Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study 
76 J. Pub. Econ. 399 (2000). 
202 Supra note 4. 
203 LLSV acknowledge several problems with their indices, for example that they do not 
cover merger and takeover rules nor stock exchange rules or regulations of financial institutions, 
and they cover disclosure rules only partially, see La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 4. 
Further, LLSV draw on inaccurate presumptions with respect to shareholder rights, at least with 
respect to the jurisdictions Germany, Belgium and France, see Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in 
Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30:3 
Del. J. Corp. L. 697 (2005). In addition come metholodigal flaws, see Mathias M. Siems, What 
Does Not work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s. Methodology 16 
ICCLR 300 (2005). Also, one may object to LLSV’s choice of index components, to the 
assignment of equal weight to each, and to the fact that LLSV disregard the general infrastructure 
of legality, or rule of law, in each country (see Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer 
Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 Economics of Transition 325 (2000); Pistor, Patterns 
of Legal change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies 1 Eur. Bus. Org. L. 
Rev. 59 (2000). 
204 Supra note 189. 
205 Supra note 201. 
206 Supra note 201. 
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This is consistent with the greater level of accountability Protestant communities 
are expected to impose upon their members. Admitting a high level of corruption 
would mean admitting one’s failure in keeping the other members of the Parish 
away from misdeeds. Amir Licht finds that the “cultural attitude [within the U.S.] 
perceives wealth and power [for the benefit of a single constituency] as desirable 
values.”207 Psychologists Shalom Schwartz and Maria Ros208 hold that in the 
U.S., societal preferences for Hierarchy and Mastery legitimate the behaviour of 
individuals who take advantage of their wealth and power. In contrast, Western 
Europeans attribute greater importance than Americans to Egalitarianism and 
Harmony. Rather than with public outcries as in Europe, Americans respond with 
deference or even admiration to the exercise of power by the mighty and wealthy.  
Michael Adams209 examined the development of values in the U.S. - a 
predominantly Calvinist society - and Canada, where Catholic, Lutheran, 
Calvinist and other immigrant backgrounds converge. According to his results, 
U.S.-Americans identify themselves with values such as Work Ethic, Patriarchy, 
Look Good Feel Good, Importance of Brand and Personal Challenge, all of which 
assigns Adams to the “Status & Security” quadrant. In contrast, the quadrant 
captured by Canadians represents values such as Global Consciousness, Cultural 
Sampling, Ecological Concern, and Brand Apathy. The fact that Americans 
associate themselves with individualistic-materialistic values, while Canadians – 
if compared with Americans! – prefer collectivist goods, is consistent with my 
theory. 
                                            
207 Licht, Accountability, supra note 55, sub 5.3, at 38 and The Maximands, supra note 48, 
at 685-86. 
208 See Schwartz & Ros, supra note 200, and the interpretation of their results in Licht, 
Accountability, supra note 55, sub 5.3, at 39; this concept is extended by Licht, The Maximands, 
supra note 48, at 681-683. 
209 See, for example, MICHAEL ADAMS, FIRE AND ICE – THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND 
THE MYTH OF CONVERGING VALUES 184 (Penguin Group, CA: Toronto: 2003). 
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IV. Caveats 
The evidential power of the above is subject to certain limits.  
 
First, it cannot be said with certainty whether religions merely reflect the 
structure of civil societies who adopted the specific strain of belief. The religion 
that was adopted for society in the aftermath of reformation depended on which 
parts of society decided upon the adoption of a particular belief. In Calvinistic 
societies, wealthy citizens of merchant backgrounds were influential, while in the 
rest of Europe, feudal structures (still) prevailed. It is thus possible that the choice 
of religion is merely a proxy for the ruling class itself: Each ruling class can be 
assumed to have chosen what was most beneficial to itself. This is particularly 
true with respect to the relationship between Calvinism and the Bourgeois 
societies in the North and the West of Switzerland, the North of the Netherlands, 
some important German commercial centers (such as the harbour city of Bremen) 
and some parts of England and Scotland.210 These societies were economically 
based on trade and commerce rather than farming, and thus could adopt the 
Calvinist economic approach more readily than other regions. Moreover, since 
monarchs (rather than cities) typically mandated Catholicism and Lutheranism in 
the 16th and 17th century – cuius regio, eius religio - the motives of these rulers in 
choosing religions is easier to determine. Generally speaking, a monarch picked a 
specific religious belief based on the consequences that the belief had with respect 
to his or her position in alliances with other monarchs or the Catholic Church. 
This observation suggests that non-religious criteria played a significant role in 
selecting religions in the first place. 
This consideration, however, does not denounce my theory, as specific 
religious beliefs have at least heavily influenced the prevailing attitude of the 
ruling class at a particular point in time. The class who chose the religion was 
                                            
210 See BERMAN, supra note 8, at 54, citing Steven Ozment: “The Protestant Reformation 
presupposed for its success a literate urban culture and seems particularly to have attracted rising 
urban groups who had experienced or were determined to come into a new political and economic 
importance.”  
- 62 - 
thereby trapped in the web provided by their choice. The societies became “path 
dependent”, given that the values preached by politicians as well as pastors, 
priests and ministers were internalized by all social classes over time.211 Thus, 
while the specific choice of a religion in the first place might have been due to 
considerations other than true belief, religion nevertheless became part of the 
specific societies’ ethics over time. This (and nothing more) suggests the ethical 
theory stated above, and this is also the reason why the theory is, at its core, an 
ethical, hence normative theory, and not a religious one. 
  
Second, the above does not present evidence with respect to the question 
of whether other societal values were more influential with respect to corporate 
governance development than religion. For example, it is possible that the values 
emphasized herein were an integral part of an efficient state administration212 or 
that democratic traditions in Switzerland and England,213 or the entrepreneurial 
spirit of immigrants in the United States214 caused the adoption of specific 
corporate governance regimes. Further, some commentators suggest that Europe 
is characterized by statist societies meaning that, generally speaking, European 
                                            
211 With respect to models of norm internalization see Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law 
for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant 144 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1657 (1996); Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion and 
History, 34 Law & Society Review 157 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Moral Rules and 
the Moral Sentiments: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System, Harvard Law and 
Economics Discussion Paper No. 342 (2001) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=293906 (February 27, 
2007); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. 
Rev. 338, 341 (1997); Licht, Social Norms, supra note 48, at 16-20; Mitchell, supra note 53, at 
216.  
212 E.g. Melvin Dubnick, Clarifying Accountability in PUBLIC SECTOR ETHICS: FINDING 
AND IMPLEMENTING VALUES 68, 70 (Charles Samford & Noel Preston & Carol-Anne Bois eds., 
2000) sees the origin of the English accountability principle in the administrative steps by William 
the Conqueror after the conquest was complete.  
213 Licht, Goldschmidt & Schwartz, supra note 55, at II.C.3. and V., focus on „democratic 
accountability“, dating it back to Socrates’ unwillingness to escape from prison and the death 
sentence, since this would undermine the stability of the state; see also Licht, Social Norms, supra 
note 48, sub V.D., at 69.  
214 Licht et al., supra note 10, at IV.B.3. show strong preferences in English speaking 
countries for Mastery and de-emphasis of Harmony, and explain this with frontier experience, 
active development, and the centrality of entrepreneurial business.  
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societies were adverse to change, while the United States’ society is antistatist.215 
Moreover, some216 believe that homogeneity versus heterogeneity, hence social 
cohesion, is the decisive aspect. Other criteria may also exist that weaken the 
ethical theory presented herein.  
In theory, it is possible (but unlikely) that all leading members of the 
societies analyzed in this paper were atheists or opportunists when deciding on the 
development of corporate governance systems. It is also possible that, in fact, 
other influences prompted the developments discussed above. The general 
question of which factor was most influential is a typical statistical problem that 
empiricist discuss under the term regression analysis. In an historical setting, 
however, we cannot gather accurate data with respect to the values of individuals 
acting in the period of time that is relevant for the ethical theory. Thus, the use of 
statistical methods is not really helpful, as we are limited to drawing conclusions 
with respect to the past from what we observe today. This is unfortunate, because 
European and North American societies look different today than they did at the 
end of the industrialization period: Two World Wars, the Cold War, and 
immigration from second and third world countries have impacted on the cultural 
identity of these societies. It is thus likely that researchers dealing with the topic a 
century ago had a more accurate picture of which values prevailed in societies in 
times of industrialization. From that perspective, it is reassuring that, with respect 
to my general rationale, I find myself in good company: Max Weber held that 
what is perceived as simply another difference today is, in fact, rooted in the 
“might of religions.”217  
 
Closely related, but at a second glance, slightly different is the third 
problem, which is that of causation. While the aforementioned question describes 
the problem of which value prevails, the problem of causation looks at alternative 
                                            
215 Irving Kristol, supra note 70, at 2 et seq.; Seymour Martin Lipset, American 
Exceptionalism in CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM – A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY 34, 39-40 (Michael 
Novak, ed., AEI, Washinton, D.C., 1979). 
216 Coffee, Do norms matter?, supra note 52, at 2167. 
217 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHICS, at [81]. 
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non ethics-based explanations which might have had similar effects on policy 
makers.218 For example, Europe is one of the most crowded regions of the planet. 
In the 19th century, all European states had to deal with the reverberations of the 
Industrial Revolution, characterized by over-population and related social 
problems (the social question, addressed above). In contrast, North America is a 
very vast region, and still relatively sparsely populated. Consequently, one could 
(incorrectly219) assume that there was little pressure to deal with social problems 
in the U.S. until the Great Depression in 1929-30. Subject to this premise, one 
could argue that the severance of the problem, rather than ethics, dictated which 
path policy makers chose. However, while the large Continental jurisdictions 
intervened into the markets by requiring mandatory insurance of workers etc., in 
the UK, which was equally concerned with social problems as Continental states, 
legislators could not permanently establish a collectivist-protective legislation. 
Interestingly, we also observed interventionist tendencies in the times following 
the Great Depression in the U.S. However, similarly to the UK, U.S. American 
legislators did not generally adopt an interventionist approach. Instead, they still 
believe in market forces (which is what securities regulation is all about), and are 
even successful in exporting their belief to other countries.  
 
Finally, the data used for determining the religious preference in each 
country are a little vague.220 There exists few accurate data on religions in the 
countries that are subject to this survey. While the main streams (Catholic versus 
Protestants) are typically considered, data is lacking with respect to the sublevels 
of Protestantism. This is unfortunate, because the thesis developed herein relies on 
                                            
218 The causation issue is similar to the question examined by economists whether legal 
origin (so the Law and Finance Theory) or endowment (Endowment Theory) is more important for 
developing capital markets, see e.g. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law 
Endowments and Finance 70:2 J. Fin. Econ. 137 (2003).  
219 See Forbath, supra note 98, at 1142-58 for the urgency of the Social Question in the 
U.S. and the struggle between collectivist Progressives and individualist Liberals.  
220 See Appendix 1. 
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the differences among certain strains of Protestantism. Nevertheless, I hold that 
the big picture, which the murky data allows, reveals remarkable consistency. 
V. Intermediate Result 
While this section did not, from a scientific point of view, prove that ethics are the 
sole force having driven corporate governance development in the past, it 
suggested that ethics had an important role to play when policy makers decided in 
favor of one or the other way of encouraging management to remain honourable 
and appreciative of other stakeholders’ property. Within the caveats of this study, 
it is thus reasonable to assume that the trust or distrust in market forces that is 
evidenced through certain jurisdictions’ corporate governance development over 
time is characteristic of the religious strain of belief prevailing in the specific 
jurisdiction. 
 E. Shareholder Value in the Present and Future: Where do we go 
from here? 
Turning Edmund Burke’s phrase221 into a positive statement, it is the past 
that reveals to us how we can shape the future.222 What does the ethical theory of 
corporate governance history implicate with respect to present and future 
corporate governance policy? Are some regulatory measures unlikely to succeed 
in corporate governance systems based on Calvinistic ethics, as compared to 
Catholicism, or Lutheranism, or vice versa? For example, in the Lutheran 
countries of Norway, Sweden, etc., but also in Germany, data collected by Mark 
Roe (in Political Determinants) show few diversions of assets by controlling 
shareholders to the detriment of small shareholders. Is this the result of a legal 
                                            
221 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND ON THE 
PROCEEDING IN CERTAIN SOCIETIES IN LONDON RELATIVE TO THAT EVENT IN A LETTER INTENDED 
TO HAVE BEEN SENT TO A GENTLEMAN IN PARIS ¶ 56 (1790) (The Harvard Classics) available at  
www.bartleby.com/24/3/3.html (February 27, 2007): “People will not look forward to posterity, 
who never look backward to their ancestors.” 
222 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, cited from BERMAN, supra note 8, preface at X. How the 
past can help shape the future is examined by Michaels & Jansen, supra note 121, at 41-49. 
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regime, or of ethics? Provocatively stated, may we explain inefficient Italian 
minority protection by reference to Catholicism?  
Given the complexity of the issues presented , this section is unable to 
answer all of these questions, and even with respect to the questions that it does 
attempt to answer, the analysis results in a sometimes lighter, and sometimes 
darker, shade of grey, rather than being answered with black-and-white statements 
positing bright-line distinctions. These, however, constitute typical characteristics 
of interdisciplinary studies involving social sciences and law. 
At the very least, the ethical theory provides an answer to one question in 
international comparative corporate governance theory which is discussed under 
the term “transplant effect:”223 If, in fact, ethics do influence corporate 
governance efficiency, transferring the legal scheme of one successful corporate 
governance system to another is unlikely to yield the desired results.224 Rather, 
notwithstanding ethical indifference, the ethical theory suggests that the legal 
scheme needs to be adjusted to the specific ethical background of the corporate 
governance system to which it is being transferred. 
In this section, I will further focus on three core issues of the contemporary 
convergence debate. These are the question of “path dependency” (sub I.), the 
question of which values prevail to what extent in which country (sub II.), and 
finally, the question of whether and with what implications values converge (sub 
III.).  
I. Ethical “Path Dependency” 
Some recent statements emphasize the interest in examining whether and 
to what extent ethics interact with economic forces that may prompt path 
dependency. According to Mitchell, culture is what economists seek to explain 
with theories on path dependency;225 Amir Licht considers culture to be ”the 
                                            
223 See, for example, Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, Economic Development, supra note 51; 
Nuno Garoupa & Anthoy Ogus A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants 35:2 J. Leg. 
Studies 339 (2006). 
224 In the same vein Licht, The Maximands, supra note 48, at 683. 
225 Mitchell, supra note 53, at 233 et seq. 
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mother of all path dependencies.”226 For economists, path dependency is a 
collective action problem: even though the state after adoption of certain legal 
regimes is expected to be superior, in summa, a society is blocked from adopting 
these laws in the first place, due to particular interests of groups that either 
personally benefit from the current detrimental state, or that are unwilling to pay 
the costs of change mandated by the reform.227 On the grounds of my ethical 
theory, path dependency can be explained through ethical resistance, as well. 
Even though a state may, from an economic point of view, be considered superior 
– if you assume rational actors only, putting all ethics aside –, it may not be 
considered superior from an ethical point of view, as the economically superior 
state does not cater societal preferences.228 This is, for example, the case with 
respect to the “hire-and-fire” mentality and “predator capitalism” that some 
Continental Europeans associate with Anglo-American investors. It is simply not 
consistent with ethics that rely on the principle of responsibility for one’s 
followers to lay workers off, as long as the business itself is doing well. Under 
these conditions, reforms will be opposed on the grounds of ethical, rather than 
the individual’s economic, concerns. Similarly, even in the absence of minority 
rights, in a society in which these ethics are commonly accepted, small 
shareholders may be more willing to trust controlling shareholders (regardless of 
whether this trust is justified from an economic point of view), given that ripping-
off minority shareholders would pose significant risks to the controller’s 
reputation.229  
Further, path dependency may also be facilitated through the fact that these 
ethics are embedded into, or even pillars of, the contemporary legal system. This 
observation is consistent with Katharina Pistor’s proposition on ground-rules that 
                                            
226 Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies, supra note 55. 
227 See the references supra note 38. 
228 Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 223, at 359 cite these preferences as a basis of resistance 
which harmonization and unification cannot overcome. 
229 For a reputation-based explanation of the existence of minority shareholders, see Gilson, 
supra note 41. 
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are based on social preferences,230 according to which these social preferences are 
deeply rooted in law and complementary legal institutions, which account for a 
high level of path dependency. I share her view.  
II. The “Value Graphs” 
Moreover, my ethical theory suggests that we need an ethically adjusted 
understanding of what “shareholder value” means in each and every country, so 
that it is possible to accurately evaluate efficiency of legal regimes. As stated 
above, in Lutheran and Catholic countries, “shareholder value” traditionally 
includes taking responsibility for one’s followers. These values can hardly be 
measured, from an economic point of view. Chart 4 and 5 nevertheless (try to) 
outline which, and to what extent, other values are added to the uniform goal of 
corporations to make profits in each of the countries’ corporate governance 
systems.  
Chart 4 
                                            
230 Pistor, supra note 182. 
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Values I: Collectivism <> Individualism (present)
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Chart 5 
 
Value II: Catholicity <> Accountability (present)













 The above are very rough graphs derived from the above distinction 
between Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism. By lack of a better measure, I 
counted members of the Anglican churches to 50% (57% of the British, but only 
3% of the Canadian population) on each side, because the contemporary Anglican 
Church’s business ethics is a mix between Catholicism and Protestantism.  
The charts embody the extreme sides of individualism and collectivism, 
and catholicism and accountability, respectively. The more extreme the country 
stands on the collectivist side, the more significant the influence of collectivist 
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ethics on business behaviour, signalled by interference with market forces and 
underdeveloped stock markets. Similarly, the higher the level of catholicism, the 
fewer direct returns a shareholder may expect. However, it needs to be 
emphasized that a high level of indirect returns - something that has not been 
measured yet accurately - may counter the adverse effects of a less accountable 
management and controlling shareholders.231  
III. Morphing Values?  
The above considerations, with respect to path dependency, were subject 
to the condition that societies do not become indifferent with respect to cultural 
values that are based on religion. Besides religious indifference, which is not the 
same as atheism in this specific context, the ethical “path dependency” can also be 
overcome through certain societal values becoming more and more similar over 
time, due to access to similar sources of information, businesses, and politics. If 
values and norms morph over time, the functionality of certain rules should be 
expected to become similar, as well.  
I personally believe that values among Western civilizations are 
converging, though this is yet based on speculation, rather than facts. As law is, to 
a certain extent, evidence of pre-eminent values,232 current corporate law reforms 
may support my hypothesis: British233 and American234 authors frequently argue 
in favour of expanding explicit devices of corporate control, which imply greater 
shareholder control over managers, while for e.g., the German legislature has 
expanded the pro-market rules over the last decade (at the expense of minority 
                                            
231 From an economic point of view, leisure time, social equality etc. may be understood as 
indirect returns of stakeholders in Continental jurisdictions.  
232 For the interaction between law and norms see Mitchell, supra note 53, at 235 et seq. 
233 In fact, Eilis Ferran argued in The Role of the Shareholder in Internal Corporate 
Governance: Enabling Shareholders to make better informed decisions 4 EBOR 491 (2003), for 
strengthening explicit shareholder rights in UK and Europe. 
234 With Lucian A. Bebchuck playing the leading role in American academia, see for 
example The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118:3 Harvard L.R. 833 (2005) and The 
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence & Policy (with John Coates 
IV & Guhan Subramanian) 54 Stanford Law Review 887 (2002) and The Case Against Board Veto 
in Corporate Takeovers 69 University of Chicago Law Review 973 (2002). 
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shareholders influence).235 Furthermore, the recent implementation of the 
European Directives on Market Abuse, Transparency, Prospectuses and 
Takeovers236 brought French and German securities law closer to an Implicit 
System. However, at least, with respect to Canada and the United States, Michael 
Adams237 does not share my view. By addressing the issue of morphing values, 
my paper would completely deviate from its topic, which is to show that there is, 
in fact, a correlation between ethics and corporate law. Thus, I will restrict myself 
and leave this far-reaching issue to sociologists and psychologists who are better 
trained and skilled to undertake such an endeavour than a corporate lawyer. 
 F. Conclusion 
Aspects other than purely economic considerations can add to the 
understanding of present corporate governance systems. In particular, ethics 
grounded in certain strains of Christendom are likely to have influenced the 
specific development path that Anglo-American and Continental-European 
corporate governance systems took in times of industrialization. This development 
path formed the foundation of the corporate governance model that we see in 
Western countries today. This paper also determined which social norms are 
likely to prevail, and thus, which non-legal institutions complement the legal 
institutions in these countries today. 
The results of this paper are apt to prompt reconsideration of those 
convergence theories that have refrained from acknowledging cultural influences 
as an important factor in answering the question which asks why, and to what 
extent, legal convergence is beneficial to societies. Further, while in times of 
                                            
235 See, e.g., Wolfgang Zöllner, Aktionär und Eigentum [Shareholder and Property], DER 
GESELLSCHAFTER 2004, 5; Noack & Zetzsche, supra note 42. 
236 Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16-23; Parliament and Council Directive 
2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38-57; 
Parliament and Council Directive 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities 
are offered to the public or admitted to trading, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64-89; Parliament and Council 
Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12-23 
237 Supra note 209. 
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economic growth people tend to veer toward atheism, people and policy-makers 
reconsider their cultural and religious identities in times of economic decline. 
Under this premise, morphing values and thus convergence of corporate 
governance rules - both from a legal and an efficiency perspective - seem more 
likely in times of economic growth, while path dependency is furthered when 
there is less to share. This ethical approach is consistent with economic 
explanations: in times where there is less wealth to go around, societies look for 
explanations to lock competitors out. Incumbents can easily mark intruders with 
the accusation of violating norms of the respective society. Partly, this accusation 
is correct because outsider management may look out for the loopholes of a laxer 
legal regime, as it does not personally feel obliged to adhere to the social norms in 
society. Normative restraints do not bind outsiders. 
In light of these considerations, when adopting foreign legal regimes, 
legislators are strongly encouraged to review which non-legal influences explain, 
strengthen or balance the specific effects of the regime they seek to adopt. If they 
miss this aspect, they are likely to achieve different results than they intended – 
with a potentially fatal impact on the countries’ economy.  
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Appendix 1: Religions in Major Jurisdictions of Europe and North America 
Use of italics signals estimate by the author re Lutheran / Calvinist ; "Other" may include religions not specified in other columns. 
Year Country Catholics Lutheran Calvinist Orthodox Jewish Muslims Atheist Other 
2005 Albania 10,00%    20,00%  70,00%    
2005 Austria 78,00%   5,00%    2,00% 9,00% 6,00% 
2000 Belarus 8,00%    60,00%     32,00% 
2005 Belgium 75,00% 25,00%          
2005 Bosnia Herz.  15,00% 4,00%   31,00%   40,00%   10,00% 
2000 Bulgaria 1,00%    84,00% 1,00% 13,00%  1,00% 
2000 Canada 47,00% 1,00% 40,00%       12,00% 
2001 Croatia 87,80% 0,30%  4,40%  1,30%  6,20% 
2005 Czech Republic 39,20% 4,60%  3,00%    39,80% 13,40% 
2005 Denmark 2,00% 95,00% 1,00%         2,00% 
2005 Finland  89,00%  1,00%    9,00% 1,00% 
2005 France 85,00%   2,00%   1,00% 8,00% 4,00%   
2005 FYROM     67,00%  30,00%  3,00% 
2005 Germany 33,00% 33,00%  1,50%  3,20% 28,30% 1,00% 
2005 Greece       98,00%   1,30%   0,70% 
2005 Hungary 67,50% 5,00% 20,00%       7,50% 
1998 Ireland 91,60%   2,50%       5,90% 
2005 Italy 97,31%          2,69% 
2000 Luxembourg 87,00%          13,00% 
2005 Mexico 89,00%   6,00%         5,00% 
1998 Netherlands 31,00%   21,00%    4,40% 40,00% 3,60% 
2000 Norway 1,00% 89,00%        10,00% 
2005 Poland 75,00%         20,00% 5,00% 
1995 Portugal 94,00% 6,00%          
2002 Romania 5,60% 6,80%   87,00%   0,40% 0,20%   
2005 Serbia Monten. 4,00% 1,00%  65,00%  19,00%  11,00% 
2005 Slovakia 60,30% 8,40%  4,10%    9,70% 17,50% 
2005 Slovenia 70.8% 1,00%     1,00% 4,30% 22,90% 
2005 Spain 94,00%          6,00% 
2005 Sweden 2,00% 87,00% 1,00% 1,00%   1,00%   8,00% 
2000 Switzerland 41,20%   42,70% 0,50% 0,20% 0,60% 10,80% 4,00% 
2001 UK 9,00% 5,00% 57,00%   0,50% 2,70% 23,00% 2,80% 
  
(Source CIA World Factbook March 2005; DK World Desk Reference 2000; 
2002 United States 24,00%   54,00%   1,00% 1,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
www.wigipedia.de; adjustment by the author) 
